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I. INTRODUCTION
Aliens' living in the United States, unlike those living abroad, 2
acquire constitutional rights by virtue of their physical presence
within the country. The United States Supreme Court has held that
nonimmigrant aliens, 3 illegal aliens, and lawful permanent resident
aliens ("LPRs") 4 are "persons" with enforceable rights under the
United States Constitution.5 LPRs seemingly enjoy increased consti-
tutional protection, 6 but under current statutory and case law, these
otherwise protected rights may dissipate once the resident alien de-
1. An alien is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." Immigration
and Nationality Act § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(3) (1988) [hereinafter INA].
2. Aliens seeking initial admission into the United States have no constitutional rights.
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
596-97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972);
United States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); United States ex reL
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904); see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977);
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
3. "Nonimmigrant" aliens include diplomats, aliens who temporarily visit the United
States for business, study or pleasure, or alien crew members of vessels making temporary calls
in the United States. INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15).
4. "LPR" is a common abbreviation used by the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice ("INS") that means "lawful permanent resident." Such aliens possess "the status of hav-
ing been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." Id.
§ 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(20). "Permanent" refers to a "relationship of continuing or
lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but... it ... may be dissolved eventually at
the instance ... of the United States ..." Id. § 101(a)(31), 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(31). A person's
"residence" is his principle, actual dwelling place in fact (general abode) "without regard to
intent." Id. § 101(a)(33), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33).
5. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (alien a "person" under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (alien a "per-
son" under the fourteenth amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (First,
fifth and fourteenth amendments do not acknowledge "any distinction between citizens and
resident aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all 'persons'...."); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("The Fourteenth Amendment... is not confined to the
protection of citizens... [Its] provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within
(.. [the United States.]").
6. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982). "[O]nce an alien gains admission to
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.JV
parts the country and then attempts to re-enter.7
In Rafeedie v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,8 Fouad
Rafeedie, an LPR in the United States for fourteen years, discovered
that after he made a trip overseas, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service ("INS") could bar his legal re-entry into this country,
simply on the basis of undisclosed and unproven allegations.9 In con-
trast to many prior federal court decisions which deferred to the gov-
ernment's political branches in the area of immigration law,' 0 the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Rafeedie
was entitled to procedural due process in his exclusion proceeding.
The procedural protections to which Rafeedie and others similarly
situated should be entitled are the subject of this Note."
First, this Note will briefly examine the constitutional and statu-
tory framework pertaining to LPR exclusion. Second, this Note will
set forth the facts of Rafeedie's attempted summary exclusion.12 This
Note will then analyze relevant federal court decisions and suggest
alternative procedural protections which can remedy the constitu-
tional problems inherent in summary exclusion. Finally, this Note
will criticize the underlying assumptions and purposes of summary
exclusion to conclude that Congress should fashion exclusion laws
which consider modern views of alien rights.
our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional
status changes accordingly." Id.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 13-66 for a discussion of the re-entry doctrine.
8. 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
9. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 732, 734.
10. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly
concerned with the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these
policies, the Executive Branch ... must respect the procedural safeguards of due
process. But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Con-
gress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of
our body politic as any aspect of our government.
Id. at 531 (citations omitted); see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952). "So long
... as aliens fail to obtain ... citizenship . .. they remain subject to the plenary power of
Congress to expel them under the sovereign right to determine what noncitizens shall be per-
mitted to remain within our borders." Id.
11. See infra pp. 202-225.
12. "Summary exclusion" refers to a statutory procedure used to exclude aliens which
virtually denies them procedural due process. INA § 235 (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c); see infra p.
190.
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II. THE LEGAL PROCESS FOR RE-ENTERING LPRs
A. The Early Re-Entry Doctrine
The Supreme Court long recognized that the due process clause
of the fifth amendment protected a continuously present LPR against
arbitrary expulsion from the country.' 3 However, until the middle of
this century, an LPR who departed the United States and then at-
tempted to return completely lost these protections. Court decisions
at the turn of the century provided the durable proposition that aliens
who had never entered14 this country had no vested right to gain en-
try. In the absence of such a substantive right, Congress alone defined
what procedural rights, if any, were available to returning aliens seek-
ing admission to the United States.'5
The courts of this era considered a returning LPR to have the
same legal status as an alien entering this country for the first time.
Aliens who resided in this country could claim no greater rights upon
returning from abroad than an alien who had never set foot upon
United States soil. 16 Under this "re-entry doctrine," an LPR re-
turning to the United States was viewed as legally "standing at the
border" for the first time.17 In short, by leaving the country and at-
tempting to re-enter, the LPR became an excludable,' 8 rather than
13. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). Note that although due
process protected the alien's right to remain, it did not speak to the right to enter the country.
See also United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905) (executive decisions regarding entry
of a first time alien entrant represented due process of law).
14. "Entry" is a legal term of art that determines whether an alien may be deported or
excluded from the United States. INA § 101(aX13), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13); see infra note 50
and accompanying text.
15. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892); see also Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
16. For example, the Court in Chae Chan Ping stated that "[w]hatever license... Chi-
nese laborers may have obtained... to return to the United States after their departure, is held
at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure." 130 U.S. at 609. Con-
gress held similarly narrow views of alien rights extending well into the mid-twentieth century.
"Congress... merely accords aliens the privilege or license of residing in this country; and
regardless of the length of time of such residence, the privilege never ripens into a vested right
to remain." S. REP. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 5 (1940).
17. For an overview of the re-entry doctrine, see generally Klingsberg, Penetrating the
Entry Doctrine: Excludable Aliens' Constitutional Rights in Immigration Processes, 98 YALE
L.J. 639 (1989).
18. "Excludable" relates "to entrant aliens and ... those assimilated to their status."
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 599 (1953). An "excludable" alien is one who has
not yet legally entered the country and thus is still considered to be participating in the immi-
gration process. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1984). Thus, an
alien may be physically present within our borders, at a detention center or on parole, but is
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deportable, alien. Any procedural rights arising from the alien's for-
mer status as a continuously present resident alien simply evaporated.
The federal courts mechanically applied the re-entry doctrine
and any LPR who departed the country felt the harsh consequences
upon return.19 Although these same courts recognized that the fifth
amendment due process clause protected LPRs in deportation pro-
ceedings, they refused to examine the amendment's applicability to
the exclusion procedures used for both LPRs and nonimmigrant
aliens.2° Returning LPRs were thus reduced, as a matter of law, to
the status of excludable, first-time entrant aliens; whatever entry pro-
cedure Congress authorized was "due process as far as an alien denied
entry [was] concerned. ' 2
1
The federal judiciary's historical deference to the legislative and
executive branches in immigration matters primarily arose from the
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the separation of powers.
The Court concluded that the political branches should oversee this
area of the law so rooted in the nation's sovereignty.22 Accordingly,
considered to "remain at the border" until his admissibility is legally determined. In contrast,
"'expulsion' means forcing someone out of the United States who is actually within the United
States or is treated as being so. 'Deportation' means the moving of someone away from the
United States, after his exclusion or expulsion." Chew, 344 U.S. at 596 n.4.
19. For example, in Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 (1914), an alien lawfully residing in the
country for six years went to Canada for about a day and returned with a woman alleged to be
a prostitute. The Supreme Court upheld the LPR's exclusion, saying
if he departed from the country, even for a brief space of time, and on reentering
brought into the country a woman for the purpose of prostitution or other immoral
purpose, he subjected himself to the operation of the clauses of the Act that relate to
the exclusion and deportation of aliens, the same as if he had no previous residence
... in this country.
Id. at 297; see also Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 91 (1914) (excludability or deportability to
be determined "irrespective of any qualification arising out of a previous residence or domicile
in this country."). The early re-entry doctrine found perhaps its most rigid application in
United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (1933), where the Court upheld the deporta-
tion of a twenty-one year LPR following his re-entry after a "brief" trip to Cuba. The Court
strictly construed "entry" to include "any coming of an alien from a foreign country into the
United States whether such coming be the first or any subsequent one." Id. at 425.
20. For criticism of these early cases, see Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully
Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959) [hereinaf-
ter Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases]; Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted
Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262 (1959)
[hereinafter Hesse, The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel].
21. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
22. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 629 (1889). "The powers to
declare war ... and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers,
restricted in their exercise only by the constitution itself...." Id. The power "to establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization" is a further source of federal power over immigration. U.S.
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the courts ceded exclusive control over immigration matters to the
President and Congress.23 The executive's exclusion decisions, even if
procedurally deficient under the fifth amendment, were treated as ju-
dicially unreviewable, political questions properly categorized as con-
duct related to international relations. 24
Signs of judicial discomfort with the re-entry doctrine surfaced
soon after its inception, with a number of federal courts applying the
doctrine with "express reluctance and explicit recognition of its harsh
consequences .... -"25 Further, some courts refused to apply the doc-
trine in cases where aliens re-entered after only a "brief" absence
from the United States. 26
B. The Modern Re-Entry Doctrine
The Supreme Court finally rejected this blind application of the
re-entry doctrine in Delgadillo v. Carmichael.27 In that case, an LPR,
serving aboard an American ship during World War II, unintention-
ally arrived in Cuba after his ship was torpedoed. 2 Following his
return to the United States, the INS sought to deport him for a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years of his new en-
CONsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2. For a general discussion of other sources, see Hesse, The Pre-1917
Cases, supra note 20.
23. See generally, Hesse, The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, supra note 20.
24. Justice Jackson observed that
any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the mainte-
nance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted
to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry
or interference.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
25. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 454 (1963) (citing United States ex rel. Ueberall v.
Williams, 187 F. 470 (D.C.N.Y. 1925); Zurbrick v. Woodhead, 90 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1937);
Jackson v. Zurbrick, 59 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1932); Ex parte Piazzola, 18 F.2d 114 (W.D.N.Y.
1926); Guimond v. Howes, 9 F.2d 412 (S.D. Me. 1911)).
26. In Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947), an LPR slept through a
train journey from Buffalo to Detroit, which unknowingly took him through Canada. The
court, speaking through Judge Hand, reasoned "that the intent of a carrier, unknown to the
alien, to carry him across a border and back again ... should not be imputed to him. [T]he
alien would be subjected without means of protecting himself to the forfeiture of privileges...
of the most grave importance to him." Id. at 879. The court held that Di Pasquale should not
be subject to deportation for his "perfectly lawful conduct" which was not intended to consti-
tute a departure or entry. Id. See also United States ex rel. Valenti v. Karmuth, I F. Supp.
370 (N.D.N.Y. 1932) (student's trip across Lake Erie for school picnic not departure and re-
entry); Annello ex rel. Annello v. Ward, 8 F. Supp. 797 (D. Mass. 1934) (child's 25 minute trip
to Canada not departure and re-entry).
27. 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
28. Id. at 389.
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try.29 The Court refused to allow Delgadillo's deportation, since it
could "not attribute to Congress a purpose to make his right to re-
main here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capri-
cious .... ,,30 Delgadillo is significant because the Court rejected a
doctrinal application of the re-entry doctrine which had forced the
federal courts to blindly overlook the circumstances of an individual
alien's departure or return.
Shortly thereafter, in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,31 the Court
extended the fifth amendment right to notice and a hearing to re-
turning LPRs assimilated to continuously present status, regardless of
whether the alien had effected statutory entry. Chew, an alien with
approximately five years of lawful permanent residence, made a four
month journey as a seaman on an American merchant vessel. 32 Upon
his attempted return, the INS deemed his entry "prejudicial to the
public interest" and temporarily excluded him.33 The Attorney Gen-
eral then sought to permanently exclude Chew, while denying him
access to information regarding his case.34 The circumstances of
Chew's absence, 35 and the fact that his service on an American vessel
did not interrupt continuous residency for naturalization purposes, 36
persuaded the Court to assimilate him to the status of a continuously
present LPR for constitutional purposes.37 As a result, the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment barred the government from ex-
cluding Chew without first providing him notice and an opportunity
to be heard. 38 Although such procedural rights were already consti-
tutionally guaranteed to a continuously present LPR, the Chew court
took the guarantee one step further by extending the procedural pro-
tections to returning LPRs.39
29. Id. at 390.
30. Id. at 391. The Court noted that "the exigencies of war, not his voluntary act, put
him on foreign soil[,]" and that "[h]e had no part in selecting the foreign port as his destina-
tion. His itinerary was forced on him by wholly fortuitous circumstances." Id. at 390-91.
31. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
32. Id. at 592-95.
33. Id. at 595.
34. Id.
35. Chew was a steward on an American-flagged vessel whose home port was New York
City. He sailed with the vessel on a voyage that included stops in the Far East, but he re-
mained on board. Id. at 594.
36. Chew, 344 U.S. at 600-01.
37. Id. at 600.
38. Id. at 603. The Court noted that Chew's "status as a person within the meaning and
protection of the Fifth Amendment cannot be capriciously taken from him." Id. at 601.
39. Id. at 600.
[Vol. 13:179
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However, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei,40 the
Court upheld the summary exclusion of an alien who lawfully resided
in the United States for twenty-five years, and then sought re-entry
after a nineteen month trip abroad.4 1 The Court distinguished Chew
by characterizing Mezei's "protracted absence" as a "clear break in
.. continuous residence .... "42 The lengthy period that Mezei spent
out of the country persuaded the Court to assimilate him to the status
of an initial entrant with no procedural due process rights.43 The fact
that Mezei was excluded solely on the basis of undisclosed, confiden-
tial information carried little weight with the Court.44 Congress was
therefore the sole judge of what process was due.45
In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,46 the Court focused on the returning
LPR's statutory entry, rather than the process constitutionally due
upon his return. Fleuti had been an LPR for approximately four
years when he visited Mexico in 1956 for "a couple hours. '47 Almost
three years after his return into the country, he was ordered deported,
on the ground that he was excludable at the time of his 1956 entry as
a person afflicted with a "psychopathic personality. '48 The Court,
however, reasoned that
[c]ertainly when an alien like Fleuti who has entered the country
lawfully and has acquired a residence here steps across a border
and, in effect, steps right back, subjecting him to exclusion for a
condition for which he could not have been deported had he re-
mained in the country seems to be placing him at the mercy of the
40. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
41. Id. at 214-15. Mezei departed to visit his ailing mother in Romania, attempted to re-
enter at Ellis Island nineteen months later, and was excluded on the basis of confidential infor-
mation "the disclosure of which may [have been) prejudicial to the public interest." Id. at 200.
42. Id. at 214. Mezei departed without authorization or re-entry papers. Id. However,
Chew had a seniority clearance, departed for only four months aboard an American ship, and
had re-entry papers. Chew, 344 U.S. 592-94, 601. Additionally, Chew's maritime service
counted towards his continuous residence for naturalization purposes. Id.
43. Ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214. The Court reaffirmed the late nineteenth century view
that "the legal incidents of an alien's entry remain unaltered whether he has been here once
before or not. He is an entering alien just the same, and may be excluded if unqualified for
admission under existing immigration laws." Id. at 213 (citing Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U.S. 538, 547-48 (1895)).
44. Id. at 212 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950)).
45. Id.
46. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
47. Id. at 450.
48. Id. at 451 (Fleuti's alleged "psychopathic personality" was his homosexuality.); see
INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) ("[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, [or]
sexual deviation ..." shall be excluded).
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"sport of chance" and "meaningless and irrational
hazards .... ,,49
The Court noted that Congress had enacted an intent exception
to the statutory entry laws50 to ameliorate the severe results of the
early re-entry doctrine.51 The Court refused to believe that Congress
desired to exclude LPRs returning from short trips abroad, such as
Fleuti's excursion. Accordingly, the Court construed the intent ex-
ception to mean "an intent to depart in a manner which can be re-
garded as meaningfully interruptive of the aliens's permanent
residence. '5 2 To determine the LPR's intent, the Fleuti Court di-
rected the government to scrutinize the length of the alien's absence, 53
the purpose of the visit,5 4 and the travel preparations.5 5 The Court
concluded that "an innocent, casual and brief excursion by a resident
alien outside this country's borders may not have been 'intended' as a
departure disruptive of his ... status and therefore may not subject
him to the consequences of an 'entry' into the country on his
return. ' '5 6
The Fleuti decision implied that an LPR who "intentionally" in-
terrupts his permanent residence with a trip abroad can be excluded
without due process upon his or her attempted re-entry.57 A return
after an unintended interruption, on the other hand, would not be
49. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 460 (quoting DiPasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir.
1947)).
50. See INA § 101(aX13), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13), which provides that an LPR returning
to this country does not make an entry if "his departure to a foreign port or place or to an
outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a
foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary ......
51. 374 U.S. at 461-62.
52. Id. at 462.
53. Id.
54. Id. "If the purpose of leaving the country is to accomplish some object which is itself
contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would appear that the interrup-
tion of residence thereby occurring would properly be regarded as meaningful." Id.
55. Id. "The need to obtain [travel documents] might well cause the alien to consider
more fully the implications involved in his leaving the country." Id.
56. 374 U.S. at 462. The Court opened the door to wide judicial discretion in weighing
these and other "relevant factors" that might be developed "by the gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion." Id. (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877)). For a
discussion of how the courts have applied the Fleuti factors, see Comment, Ensuring Due
Process in Alien Exclusion Proceedings After Landon v. Plasencia, 34 HASTINGS L.. 911, 919
n.63 (1983).
57. After a long absence, the alien "may lose his entitlement to 'assimilat[ion of his]
status' to that of an alien continuously residing and physically present in the United States."
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590, 596 (1953)),
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considered a re-entry, and the government could only expel the LPR
by observing the procedural due process protections afforded in de-
portation hearings. Thus, Fleuti left two important issues unresolved:
first, what procedural protections are due, if any, for an LPR in an
exclusion proceeding; and second, whether the initial re-entry ques-
tion should be resolved in an exclusion or deportation proceeding.
In Landon v. Plasencia,5 the Supreme Court addressed both un-
resolved issues, but only settled the first issue regarding exclusionary
proceedings. In Plasencia, a five-year LPR made a two day trip into
Mexico. Upon her attempted return, she was detained by the INS at
the border on suspicion of smuggling aliens into the United States.5 9
The following day, the INS notified Plasencia that it would hold an
exclusion hearing at 11:00 a.m. that same morning.w° At this hearing,
the immigration judge found Plasencia to have made a "meaningful"
departure from the United States, and thus characterized her return
to the United States as a re-entry which allowed her to be excluded
without due process. 61 Plasencia, however, challenged her resulting
exclusion under the fifth amendment.
On appeal, the Court agreed that the question of a returning
LPR's statutory re-entry may be determined in an exclusion, rather
than a deportation, hearing. 62 However, regarding the due process
issue, the Court noted that Chew required the government to observe
procedural due process when excluding an LPR returning from a
brief trip abroad. 63 Therefore, given the fact that Plasencia's trip was
sufficiently brief' and that she had a significant liberty interest in re-
admission to the country, 65 the Court held that she was protected by
58. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
59. Id. at 23. An INS officer discovered six nonresident aliens in Plasencia's car. Id.
60. Id. at 23-24.
61. Id. at 24. Consequently, she was ordered excluded and deported. Id. at 25.
62. Id. at 28. The Court noted that "[n]othing... suggests that [Plasencia's] status as a
permanent resident entitles her to a suspension of the exclusion hearing or requires the INS to
proceed only through a deportation hearing." Id.
63. 459 U.S. at 31. Although Chew focused its analysis on regulatory interpretation, the
Plasencia Court explicitly recognized that Chew's "rationale was one of constitutional law."
Id. at 33.
64. The Court explicitly refused to decide what length of time would be sufficient to
assimilate an LPR to the status of an initial entrant, since the government conceded that
Plasencia's departure was sufficiently brief to entitle her to due process. Id. at 34.
65. Plasencia's "weighty" liberty interests included her right to live and work in the
United States, and to rejoin her immediate family, the latter being "a right that ranks high
among the interests of the individual." Id.
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the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 6"
Plasencia thus allows the government to determine the entry
question in an exclusion hearing. More significantly, however, the
Court now requires that this exclusion hearing conform to procedural
due process regardless of whether the LPR effected a statutory re-
entry.
C. Statutory Framework
Although Plasencia requires an exclusion proceeding involving
an LPR who returns after a brief trip abroad to conform to proce-
dural due process, current statutes allow the government, in certain
limited circumstances, to exclude an LPR with practically no proce-
dural due process. Which exclusion procedures apply depend upon
the reasons for the LPR's exclusion, and whether confidential infor-
mation supports excludability.
If an alien's entry into the United States jeopardizes the coun-
try's national security interests, federal statutes give the government
broad powers. Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("INA")67 bars entry to those aliens whose activities may be prej-
udicial to the United States.68 Additionally, section 212(a)(28) pur-
ports to filter out those aliens whose ideology includes advocating the
use of violence against the United States government. 69
66. Id. at 32. Since the parties had focused on the entitlement to a deportation, rather
than an exclusion hearing, the briefs and arguments insufficiently developed the issue of the
precise procedures due. The Court remanded the case for a determination of what process
Plasencia was due, with instructions to balance the competing interests at issue. Id. at 37.
67. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 733-34. The INA is also known as the McCarran-
Walter Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1557 (1988)).
68. An alien may be ordered excluded if a consular official or the Attorney General either
"knows or has reason to believe [that the alien] seek[s] to enter the United States solely, princi-
pally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest,
or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States ... INA § 212(a)(21), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27).
69. Aliens may be excluded
who advocate or teach or who are members of or affiliated with any organization that
advocates or teaches... (ii) the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assault-
ing or killing of any officer or officers... of the Government of the United States or
of any other organized government, because of his or their official character; or (iii)
the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property; or (iv) sabotage.
INA § 212(aX28)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(F).
One district court recently found section 1251 (a)(6) of Title 8 of the United States Code, a
deportation statute with provisions identical to INA sections 212(a)(28)(F)(ii) and (iii), to be
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), argument heard on appeal, No. 89-55358 (9th Cir.
Aug. 10, 1990). Rafeedie has raised similar issues on remand. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in
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Once the INS70 concludes that section 212(a)(27), or 212(a)(28)
applies, it will temporarily exclude the alien and forward the case,
without further inquiry, to the Attorney General. 7' At this point, the
alien receives notice only of the action taken and his right to make
written representations. 72 If satisfied that the alien is excludable
under section 212(a)(27), 212(a)(28), or 212(a)(29), the responsible
INS regional commissioner must then decide how to conduct any fur-
ther exclusion proceedings.73
As a threshold matter, the commissioner, exercising his discre-
tion, must ascertain whether the basis of the alien's excludability im-
plicates confidential information, "the disclosure of which would be
prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security .... ,,74 The com-
missioner's findings will determine which of two distinct exclusion al-
ternatives will be selected. If the commissioner concludes confidential
information, if disclosed, will not prejudice the "public interest,
safety, or security," he may either direct an immigration officer to
further examine the alien as to his admissibility, or order the alien to
undergo plenary exclusion hearings pursuant to section 236 of the
INA. 75 If the commissioner decides he must protect against prejudi-
cial disclosure of confidential information, he may conduct summary
exclusion proceedings pursuant to section 235(c). 76
Plenary exclusion hearings provide a number of procedural safe-
guards.77 An immigration judge, rather than the regional commis-
Support of Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at 32-43, Rafeedie v. INS, No.
88-0366-JHG (D.D.C. 1990). This Note does not address these issues, but simply focuses on
the summary procedures used to implement the substantive exclusion laws.
70. Normally, the INS examining officer at the port of entry makes this initial determina-
tion. In Rafeedie's case, however, other INS officials made the decision well after Rafeedie had
been paroled into the country. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 733-34.
71. INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c). Section 212(a)(29) allows the government to ex-
clude aliens whose suspected activities after entry would include espionage, sabotage, or over-
throw of the government. INA § 212 (a)(29), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(29). This section also supports
an alien's temporary exclusion. INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c). In addition, the Attorney
General authorizes cases involving temporary exclusions to be forwarded directly to the INS
regional commissioners for review. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(a) (1989).
72. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(a) (1989); see also INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c).
73. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b) (1989).
74. Id. at § 235.8(b)-235.8(d).
75. See id. at § 235.8(b).
76. Id.
77. Plenary hearings may be terminated at any time. For example, "if confidential infor-
mation, not previously considered in the matter is adduced supporting the exclusion of the
alien under paragraph (27), (28), or (29) of section 212(a) of the [INA]," and the immigration
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, decides the disclosure of the confidential information
"may be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security .... " the judge can "temporarily
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sioner, conducts the hearings. Unlike the regional commissioner, the
immigration judge remains independent of the prosecutorial and in-
vestigative functions of the INS78 and can be expected to render a
more independent and detached evaluation of the alien's excludabil-
ity.79 The alien must explicitly be informed: (1) of his or her ability to
have the hearing open to the public; (2) of the nature and purpose of
the hearing; (3) of the right to counsel; and (4) "that he will have a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence in his own behalf, to ex-
amine and object to evidence against him, and to cross-examine wit-
nesses presented by the government. . . ,,so The immigration judge
must provide the basis for his decision in writing,8' and ensure that a
complete record of the proceedings is maintained.8 2 Finally, the alien
has the right to appeal the decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals.8 3
Summary exclusion proceedings, intended to protect against
prejudicial disclosure of confidential information, provide the alien
with no such procedural protections. If confidential information pro-
vides the basis for excludability, the INS regional commissioner has
the authority to "deny any hearing or further hearing by a special
inquiry officer and order [the] alien excluded and deported ... . ",84
The alien will merely receive an order "showing only the ultimate
disposition of the case... signed by the regional commissioner...."85
The decision of the regional commissioner is final. The regulations
provide no avenue of appeal. 86
exclude" the alien, and summary exclusion proceedings would then re-commence. 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.8(d) (1989).
78. Immigration judges or special inquiry officers conduct exclusion and deportation
hearings assigned by the Attorney General. These judges, along with the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, are supervised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, an entity com-
pletely separate from the investigative and enforcement functions delegated to the INS.
However, they remain subject to the authority of the Attorney General. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1,
2.1, 3.0, 3.1, 3.3, 3.9-3.10 (1989).
79. But see infra text accompanying notes 288-316.
80. 8 C.F.R. § 236.2(a) (1989).
81. Id. at § 236.5(a) - 236.5(b).
82. Id. at § 236.2(e).
83. Id. at § 236.7.
84. Id. at § 235.8(b). In Rafeedie's case, the court of appeals noted that "there is no
practical possibility that the Regional Commissioner will take a legal position inconsistent with
that adopted by the 'chief legal officer' of the INS." Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 516.
85. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(c) (1989).
86. Id. Only habeas corpus relief is available. INA § 105(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
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III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Fouad Rafeedie was a Jordanian national who had been an LPR
in the United States since 1975.87 His wife and child were United
States citizens, and his mother and thirty-four other relatives resided
in the United States. 88 He received a post-graduate education and
had been employed during his residence in this country.89 A political
activist since his arrival in the United States, Rafeedie outspokenly
criticized the United States government's policies toward Palestinians
in the Middle East 90
On April 7, 1986, the INS granted Rafeedie a re-entry permit
allowing him to travel abroad, ostensibly to visit his mother in Cyprus
during her major heart surgery.9 1 In reality, Rafeedie traveled to
Syria after first obtaining a visa at the Syrian embassy. 92 Rafeedie
then allegedly attended the First Conference of the Palestine Youth
Organization, a group the United States government claimed was af-
filiated with terrorist organizations. 93 Less than a month after his de-
parture, Rafeedie returned to New York, where he was questioned by
the INS,94 and paroled 95 for a deferred inspection, which was con-
87. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 508.
88. Id.
89. Id. Upon submission of a thesis, Rafeedie is eligible to receive a Master of Science
degree in clinical chemistry from Youngstown State University. At the time of his trial, he
was an assistant manager at a Cleveland, Ohio grocery store. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at
732.
90. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 732. The district court noted that Rafeedie wrote
"numerous articles and appeared on television and radio programs ... and... belong[ed] to a
number of Arab and Palestinian political and cultural organizations in this country." Id.
91. Id. The INS alleged that she never had the surgery but remained in her Ohio resi-
dence. Id.
92. Id. The visa had been stamped into his re-entry permit. Id.
93. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 509. The INS claimed that the Palestine Youth Organization
"is affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and that the PFLP
is a terrorist organization and a 'constituent group' of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO)." Id.
94. "Every alien ... who may not appear to the examining immigration officer at the port
of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further in-
quiry .... INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
95. To parole an alien into the country is to allow him physical, but not legal, entry. The
Attorney General may temporarily parole aliens into the United States "under conditions as
he may proscribe for emergent reasons or reasons deemed strictly in the public interest ...."
INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). But, parole "shall not be regarded as an admission of
the alien." Id. One commentator explains that "an alien is allowed to travel away from the
border... yet remain subject to exclusion proceedings, rather than the more ... protective
deportation proceedings... technically, a parolee has made no entry." See T. ALEINIKOFF &
D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 232 (1985).
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ducted on May 15, 1986.96 In May of the following year, the INS
charged Rafeedie as "excludable" 97 under INA sections 212(a)(27)
and (a)(28)(F).
Rafeedie's case was initially assigned for plenary hearings to an
immigration judge98 who ordered the INS to give Rafeedie specific
notice of the charges against him and to reveal whether he was the
subject of electronic surveillance. 99 But on December 31, 1987, one
business day before the deadline for compliance with the judge's or-
der, the INS temporarily excluded Rafeedie pursuant to section
235(c). 100
At this eleventh hour, the INS asserted that it had acquired new
confidential information which purportedly required Rafeedie's exclu-
sion.10 1 Although Rafeedie himself received no indication as to the
content of the confidential information, 10 2 during later proceedings in
district court, the INS alleged that the information revealed Rafeedie
to be a "high ranking member of the PFLP [Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine] in the United States."10 3 The confidential in-
formation allegedly portrayed Rafeedie as an active fundraiser and
recruiter for the organization, who sustained combat wounds in 1982
96. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 733. During this inspection, Rafeedie claimed he
did not travel to Cyprus because his sister had telephoned, saying his mother's surgery had
been cancelled. Id. Rafeedie did not respond to subsequent INS requests to verify this infor-
mation. Id.
97. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Since the INS merely paroled Rafeedie
into the country, he was not entitled to a deportation hearing, but was instead subject to exclu-
sion proceedings, despite his physical presence within the country. See Landon v. Plasencia,
459 U.S. 21, 28 (1982). "[WMhether or not the alien is a permanent resident, admissibility shall
be determined in an exclusion hearing." Ia
98. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 509.
99. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 734.
100. Id. If the examining official at the port of entry concludes an alien is excludable
pursuant to INA § 212(a)(27), (28), or (29), the alien will be "temporarily excluded," and the
case reported to the INS district director. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(a) (1989). The INS regional com-
missioner has the authority to conduct further exclusion proceedings. Id. § 235.8(b).
101. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 734.
102. Rafeedie received Form 1-147 from the INS, which asserted that "[t]he confidential
information establishe[d] that (his] admission into the United States would be prejudicial to
the public interest, safety, or security. Disclosure of the confidential information would be
prejudicial to the public interest, safety or security." Id. The INS set forth further factual
allegations not involving confidential information. In part, the INS alleged that Rafeedie trav-
eled with Tarak Mustafa (a United States citizen) and Sulieman Shihadeh (an LPR), both
allegedly PFLP members who knew Rafeedie prior to the trip; that all three attended the
Palestine Youth Organization ("PYO") conference; and that photographic and written evi-
dence linking Rafeedie to the PFLP was confiscated upon their return. Id. at 732-34.
103. Id. at 734. The INS alleged that the PYO is affiliated with the PFLP. Id. at 731.
1990] Summary Exclusion and Procedural Due Process 193
while fighting for the PFLP in Lebanon.10 4
Since the INS commenced summary proceedings against
Rafeedie pursuant to section 235(c), on January 5, 1989 the immigra-
tion judge granted an INS motion to close the plenary exclusion hear-
ings.105 Rafeedie's loss of the ability to confront the evidence against
him in a hearing reduced his procedural protections to the almost
meaningless right to submit written statements on his own behalf."°6
Arguing that such governmental action violated his procedural and
substantive rights under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, Rafeedie challenged his summary exclusion in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. 0 7
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION
Rafeedie contested his summary exclusion on a number of
grounds. First, he sought to temporarily enjoin the INS from summa-
rily excluding him.10 8 He also brought a motion for summary judg-
ment, primarily contending that summary exclusion violated his
rights to procedural due process under the fifth amendment. 109 He
also argued that the government's reasons for excluding him violated
both section 901(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act," 0
and his substantive due process rights under the first amendment."'
The court's analysis of Rafeedie's procedural due process claims
focused on the circumstances of his departure from the United States.
The court noted that Chew"12 stood "for the proposition that 'under
some circumstances temporary absence from our shores cannot consti-
tutionally deprive a returning lawfully resident alien of his right to be
104. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 734.
105. Id. at 735.
106. Id. at 735-36.
107. See Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 509.
108. See Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 741-42.
109. Id. at 743-51.
110. Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399 (1987).
Ill. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 751-54. Additionally, the court rejected Rafeedie's
contention that summary exclusion proceedings under section 235(c) did not apply to LPRs as
a matter of statutory construction. Using a "plain meaning" approach, the court pointed out
that section 235(c) applied to any alien, with no express or implied exceptions. Id. at 743. A
decision interpreting the statute otherwise, the court noted, "would create interpretational
problems in other sections of the [INA] where the term 'alien' is used without qualification."
Id. Further, the court noted that where Congress intended to exempt LPRs from the INA, "it
did so explicitly." Id.; see, e.g., INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
112. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
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heard.' 13 Similarly, the court relied on Mezei" 4 for its view that
"the circumstances of departure are critical to the determination of an
alien's due process rights."' 15
By centering its analysis on the circumstances of the LPR's trip
abroad, the court determined that Fleuti1 6 was controlling on the
procedural due process issue. It therefore, held that the Fleuti test," 17
used to determine whether an alien completed a statutory entry,
would also resolve in exclusion hearings whether a returning LPR
forfeited or retained the right to procedural due process."" Under
this reasoning, if Rafeedie made a "meaningful" departure, he would
not be entitled to due process upon his return. 119
Since the court considered Fleuti controlling on the procedural
due process issue, it was forced to consider the INS's allegations re-
garding Rafeedie's trip as "genuinely disputed issues of material fact"
which played a "pivotal role in the constitutional analysis. 1 20 The
court therefore denied Rafeedie's motion for summary judgment on
his procedural due process claim.' 2' However, because Rafeedie suc-
cessfully persuaded the court that he had a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of his claim, and that the proceedings would
cause him irreparable injury, 22 the court issued a preliminary injunc-
113. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 746 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953)).
114. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
115. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 746.
116. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
117. The test requires a court to determine whether the alien's trip abroad was "innocent,
brief and casual." Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 748-49; see supra text accompanying notes
52-56.
118. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 749. The court minimized the importance of
Plasencia by noting that, although under the circumstances of that case, Plasencia had a right
to due process, the Court did not decide "the contours of the process that is due ... "
Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 747. The court suggested that Plasencia was less important
for its due process analysis than for its express reaffirmance of Fleuti since the former "elabo-
rate[d] on what constitutes an interruption of permanent residence status for the purposes of
statutory definition of 'entry.'" Id.
119. See id. at 749.
120. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 749.
121. Id. While Rafeedie denied "that he has ever been a member of the PLO, the PFLP,
or a terrorist organization[,]" the INS alleged that he "intentionally lied ... about the purpose
of his trip[,] . . . traveled to Syria for two weeks to attend the conference of the Palestinian
Youth Organization[,] ... and then again lied to immigration officers about his trip upon his
reentry into the United States." Id. Further factual examination of his departure from the
United States was necessary in order to determine his right to due process. Id.
122. Id. at 754. Without such relief, Rafeedie would be subject to immediate detention
and loss of employment, interests that are especially weighty in view of his family ties. Id.
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tion against his exclusion.
The court agreed that Rafeedie raised serious procedural due
process issues, assuming he was to attain the same legal status as a
continuously present LPR.123 It noted that a section 235(c) summary
exclusion proceeding may "virtually assure[ ] that the Government
attorney would present his case without factual or legal opposi-
tion."1 24 The one opportunity Rafeedie had to present written infor-
mation on his own behalf provided no confrontational value, and was
of dubious utility, because he could not gain access to the govern-
ment's classified information.125  Somewhat ominously, the court
stated that "[w]ithout any opportunity for confrontation, there ap-
pears to be no check on the quality of the confidential information
upon which the INS relies. .... ,,126
The court then considered Rafeedie's argument that sections
212(a)(27) and 212(a)(28)(F) of the INA violated section 901 of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act ("Act"). 27 Section 901 pro-
tects all aliens from governmental reprisal for activities which would
receive protection under the Constitution "if engaged in by a United
States citizen."' 28 The INS, however, argued that two exceptions in
section 901 prevented Rafeedie from invoking its protection.129 First,
section 901 does not apply to any alien "who is a member, officer,
representative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
123. Id. at 749.
124. Id. at 750 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 41 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
125. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 749. The only information accessible to Rafeedie
simply would be "the specific statutory provisions the INS contends [he] has violated." Id. at
750.
126. Id. at 750. However, the court pointed out that even in an ordinary section 236
plenary exclusion, "Rafeedie could be excluded on the basis of information he neither sees nor
confronts." Id. at 751. Although Rafeedie might still have the benefit of an immigration judge
to scrutinize the confidential information, any national security concerns would weigh against
releasing the information. See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988);
Suci v. INS, 755 F.2d 127, 129 (8th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of this issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 220-25.
127. Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399 (1987).
128. Section 901(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no alien may be denied a visa or
excluded from admission into the United States, subject to restriction or conditions
on entry into the United States, or subject to deportation because of any past, cur-
rent, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations which, if engaged in by a United
States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the Constitution of the
United States.
101 Stat. at 1399-1400.
129. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 751.
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tion."13o Second, section 901 does not protect aliens who have, or are
likely to, engage in terrorist activity.131
The court held that the first exception did not apply, since the
"Palestine Liberation Organization" did not encompass the PFLP.
1 32
Next, the court noted that "mere association with an organization
that advocates violence or terrorism, without proof that the individ-
ual's association poses the threat feared by the Government, is an im-
permissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights."
1 33
Rafeedie, however, "may have crossed the first amendment line
drawn in Section 901 between passive membership or advocacy to ac-
tive furtherance of the aims and goals of a terrorist organization."
34
The legislative history of the Act indicated that Rafeedie's activity
would not be protected if he engaged in fundraising and recruiting
activities for the PFLP. 135 The court, therefore, denied Rafeedie sum-
mary judgment on this issue, since his participation in these activities
was a contested issue of fact.1 3
6
The court also rejected Rafeedie's argument that summary exclu-
sion chilled his first amendment right to speak out on Palestinian is-
130. Id. Section 901 does not apply to any action described in section 21(e) of the State
Department Basic Securities Act of 1956. 22 U.S.C § 2691(c) (1988).
131. Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. at 1400. Such aliens include those "who[m] a
consular official or the Attorney General knows or has reasonable ground to believe has en-
gaged, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, in a terrorist activity or is
likely to engage in a terrorist activity .... Id. Terrorist activity is "the organizing, abetting,
or participating in a wanton or indiscriminate act of violence with extreme indifference to the
risk of causing death or serious bodily injury harm to individuals not taking part in armed
hostilities." Id. § 901(b)(3), 101 Stat. at 1400. The INS contended that Rafeedie's alleged
fundraising and recruiting constituted "abetting" of terrorist activities. Rafeedie v. INS, 688
F. Supp. at 753.
132. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 752-53.
133. Id. at 752 (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)).
134. Id.
135. Id. Congress considered that "organizing, abetting, or participating in terrorist acts
or activities would include not only actually pulling a trigger or planting a bomb, but provid-
ing support or assistance, such as but not limited to: planning, providing facilities, recruiting,
financing orfundraising .. " Id. at 753. Rafeedie countered by arguing that to trigger the
terrorist exception, "the purpose of the fundraising and recruiting must be to facilitate terrorist
activities, not just generally to further the purposes of a terrorist organization." Id.
136. Id. at 753-54. The court implicitly agreed with Rafeedie's interpretation of the stat-
ute. Id. at 753. "[I]t is impossible to determine whether [Rafeedie's] alleged activities did in
fact directly aid the PFLP in carrying out terrorist activities or whether they were clearly for
nonterrorist purposes." Id. Rafeedie's interpretation finds additional support in Supreme
Court precedent. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 146 (1945) ("[C]lose cooperation
is not sufficient to establish 'affiliation' ..... It must evidence a working alliance to bring the
proscribed program to fruition."). For Rafeedie's interpretation, see supra note 135.
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sues.1 37 The court noted that "the decision to place [Rafeedie] in
Section 235(c) proceedings was based on the confidential information
allegedly showing his membership in the PFLP and not on the speech
and associational activities .. in his affidavit."' 38 Thus, the court
found that Rafeedie had not properly alleged that the INS directly
chilled his first amendment speech by charging him with PFLP-re-
lated activities. 139
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
Both the INS and Rafeedie disputed portions of the district
court's ruling. The INS appealed the ruling insofar as the order pro-
hibited it from conducting any kind of exclusion proceedings against
Rafeedie.'40 Rafeedie sought to reverse the order denying his motion
for partial summary judgment based on his substantive challenges to
summary exclusion. '
4'
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the preliminary in-
junction, but only to the extent that the order barred the INS from
applying the summary exclusion procedure to Rafeedie. 42 The court
also determined that Rafeedie's short trip abroad did not deprive him
of his right to procedural due process in an exclusion proceeding, and
he therefore was entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 43 How-
ever, since the district court did not determine exactly what process
137. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 740. The court noted that Rafeedie "failed to show
... how the summary procedure chill[ed] his first amendment rights any more than would a
Section 236 procedure before an immigration judge...." Id. Rafeedie raised this argument in
his motion for a preliminary injunction, arguing that such a chilling effect would cause him
irreparable harm. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 507. The INS also argued that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 510. The INS first asserted that Rafeedie could only obtain judicial
review via habeas corpus under section 106 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b)). Id The court
of appeals disagreed, finding that section 106 did not apply to LPRs as a matter of law. Id. at
510-13. Second, the INS argued that "[a]n order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be
reviewed by any court if the alien has not enhausted the administrative remedies available to
him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations .... See INA § 106(c), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(c). Having concluded that section 106 did not apply to an LPR, the court determined
that strict adherence to the exhaustion doctrine would irreparably harm Rafeedie and would
not serve the doctrine's general purposes. Id. at 513-18. These issues figured prominently in
the concurring and dissenting opinions. See id. at 525-42. For the discussion of these issues in
the district court, see Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 736-41. This Note does not address
these jurisdictional issues.
141. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 509.
142. Id. at 519.
143. Id. at 519-24.
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Rafeedie was due, the court of appeals could not rule as to whether he
had been denied due process.' 44 The court, therefore, remanded this
to the district court for a determination of this issue. 145
In affirming the preliminary injunction, the court addressed the
INS's contention that Rafeedie failed to show he would suffer irrepa-
rable harm. 146 Disagreeing with the district court, Judge Ginsberg
recognized that the pendency of the section 235(c) summary exclusion
proceeding would chill Rafeedie's substantive right to free speech,
1 47
thus causing him irreparable injury.
Because [Rafeedie] is subject to a secret proceeding in which
neither the substance underlying the charges against him nor the
reason for any final order of exclusion need ever be disclosed, he is
understandably concerned that he may be excluded not for terror-
ist or other illegitimate activities, but for his legitimate activities as
an outspoken critic of the Government's foreign policy.'
48
Turning to Rafeedie's procedural due process challenge,' 49 the
court noted that "an initial entrant has no liberty (or other) interest in
entering the United States, and thus has no constitutional right to any
process in that context.... ."110 On the other hand, LPRs commonly
possess numerous and close ties to this country. In Rafeedie's case,
144. Id. at 524.
145. Id. at 524-25.
146. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 519.
147. The court rejected Rafeedie's "broad claim that the institution of any deportation or
exclusion proceedings based on [sections] 212(aX27) or (28XF) would have a chilling effect on
his expressive activities .. I." Id. at 517. However, the court found the procedure of summary
exclusion to have "substantial incremental chilling effects" greatly exceeding any similar ef-
fects arising from a plenary exclusion hearing. Id. A plenary hearing affords the alien some
protection, leaving only minimal chilling effects upon the alien which are considered tolerable.
Id. Further, Rafeedie had no basis for concern that an immigration judge in a plenary pro-
ceeding would prejudge the case. See id.
148. Id. The court ignored the district court's point that section 236 plenary exclusion
hearings may likewise deny Rafeedie access to confidential information. See supra note 126
and accompanying text. Rafeedie also established irreparable injury insofar as the section
235(c) proceeding practically required him to disclose his entire defense, which would preju-
dice him in later exclusion proceedings. Id. If a court later found section 235(c) inapplicable
to Rafeedie, the INS would know his defense well in advance of any subsequent section 236
plenary exclusion. Id. Further, Rafeedie's certain detention upon the conclusion of any sum-
mary proceeding would cause him to lose his liberty and right to work in the United States.
Id. at 518.
149. On a preliminary note, the court upheld the district court's injunction against the
application of section 235(c) to Rafeedie. Id. at 519.
150. Id. at 520 (interpreting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950)).
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these included his family, employment and education.1 5' Such ties
amounted to a protected liberty interest and gave Rafeedie "a stake in
the United States substantial enough to command the protection of
due process before he may be excluded or deported....
The only remaining issue before the court was whether Rafeedie
had somehow forfeited his right to procedural due process by leaving
the country, which would allow the INS to treat him "as if he were an
initial entrant for due process purposes."' 53 The district court fo-
cused on the overall character of Rafeedie's trip abroad by applying
the "innocent, brief and casual" criteria of Fleuti to the constitutional
due process issue.' 54 The court of appeals found the district court's
reliance on Fleuti in this context misplaced. The appellate court
stated that all three Fleuti factors, taken as a whole, do not determine
whether the alien lost his procedural due process rights, but rather,
determine whether the alien effected a statutory entry.' 55
Instead, the court of appeals found only one Fleuti factor-the
length of the LPR's absence away from the United States-to be de-
terminative of the returning LPR's right to procedural due process.
In Chew, the LPR's four month absence from the United States as a
seaman on an American vessel did not interrupt his continuous resi-
dence for naturalization purposes. 56 However, in Mezei, the LPR's
nineteen month trip abroad was sufficiently protracted to curtail his
residency status for such purposes. 157 While the circumstances of
Chew's absence persuaded the Court to assimilate him to the status of
continuously present permanent resident alien, Mezei's extended ab-
sence did not. 58  Chew thus retained his procedural due process
151. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 522. The court noted that Rafeedie's liberty interest in re-
turning to the United States was especially weighty, since he was the sole financial provider for
his family. Id. at 518. LPRs like Rafeedie are also subject to the draft and service in the
armed forces. Id. at 522.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 523.
154. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 746. Indeed, the court of appeals initially framed
the procedural due process issue as "whether a permanent resident alien forfeits his liberty
interest in admission to the United States-and hence his right to due process upon reentry-
by leaving the country to engage in 'sufficiently nefarious' activities." Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at
520.
155. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 521-22.
156. 344 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1953).
157. 345 U.S. 206, 214 (1953).
158. Id. at 214. The court of appeals somewhat minimized the fact that Mezei had de-
parted "without authorization or reentry papers." See Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 520.
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rights upon returning, 159 but Mezei was held to have forfeited his
rights.
The court of appeals bolstered its reasoning by citing Landon v.
Plasencia, ° in which an LPR attempting to smuggle aliens into the
United States sought to return after a trip into Mexico lasting a "few
days."' 161 In Plasencia, the Supreme Court applied the Fleuti "inno-
cent, casual and brief" test only to the question of whether Plasencia
had made a statutory entry. 62 However, the court of appeals noted
that "even if Plasencia had made an 'entry,' she was entitled to due
process."' 63 Further, "in its due process discussion, the Plasencia
court did not so much as mention the LPR's purpose in going
abroad." 64 Since the character of Plasencia's trip had nothing to do
with her right to procedural due process upon returning, the court of
appeals in Rafeedie's case held that the Fleuti statutory entry analysis
did not apply to its constitutional analysis. 6- Otherwise, the court
reasoned,
a resident alien who is "entering" the United States would never be
entitled to due process. But such an interpretation would be incon-
sistent with Plasencia. There, the Court found that regardless of
whether Plasencia had "entered" the United States, she was enti-
tled to due process in view of the brevity of her trip abroad.166
The court of appeals concluded that "[t]he only explanation for
Plasencia is that the degree of nefariousness of the alien's trip was
irrelevant to the due process inquiry;.., the only relevant question
was whether the alien had been gone so long as to lose her permanent
resident status."' 67 In other words, a Fleuti statutory entry analysis
would apply only to the extent it examined the length of time the
159. Since the regulatory predecessor of section 235(c) would have denied Chew a hearing,
the Court refused to apply summary exclusion "to a permanent resident alien who had made a
brief trip outside the United States." Id. The Chew Court purported to ground its decision in
statutory analysis, but as the court of appeals noted, subsequent Supreme Court cases indi-
cated Chew was a decision of constitutional magnitude. Id. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 33 (1982); Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 460 (1963); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214 (1953).
160. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
161. Id. at 23.
162. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 520-21.
163. Id. at 521.
164. Id. at 522.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 521.
167. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 522. The court also reasoned that Plasencia's illegal smuggling
activities were not "innocent"; therefore, if the Supreme Court had utilized the Fleuti factors
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LPR had spent outside of the country. Therefore, the court of ap-
peals held that the district court erred by applying the entire Fleuti
test to the procedural due process issue.168 According to the court of
appeals, Rafeedie should be treated as an initial entrant with no due
process rights "[o]nly if he ha[d] been absent from this country for
such a period that he may be deemed to have abandoned his perma-
nent resident status here .. ."169
The court of appeals implied that the alien naturalization stat-
utes170 provided the dispositive constitutional guidepost as to the
length of time required for a forfeiture of procedural due process
rights. 17 At the time of Rafeedie's temporary exclusion, an LPR ab-
sent from the United States for less than six months did not interrupt
his or her continuous residence status for naturalization purposes.
7 2
Rafeedie's trip abroad was well within that time frame. The few
weeks he spent away from the country simply amounted to an insig-
nificant period of time in determining whether he forfeited or retained
his right to procedural due process.173 Therefore, he was entitled to
summary judgment on the issue as a matter of law.'
7 4
However, the court of appeals declined to hold that Rafeedie was
actually denied procedural due process.17 5 The district court, in hold-
ing that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Rafeedie
had any constitutional entitlement to due process, never reached this
issue. 176 Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the case to deter-
mine whether the process already given Rafeedie and "the limited
protections that section 235(c) requires the INS to give him in the
future" were constitutionally sufficient.'
77
Nevertheless, the court of appeals offered some guidance to the
district court noting that under Mathews v. Eldridge,78 due process
requires the government to give Rafeedie a meaningful opportunity to
in its due process analysis, certainly the nature of Plasencia's trip would not have been ignored.
Id.
168. See id. at 521-22.
169. Id. at 522-23.
170. See INA § 316(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b).
171. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 522.
172. INA § 316(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b).
173. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 522.
174. Id. at 524.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 525.
178. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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be heard. 179 The court identified the factors from the Eldridge opin-
ion for the district court to weigh in deciding whether a section 235(c)
summary exclusion had, and would, afford Rafeedie procedural due
process. 18 0
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fis-
cal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.' 8 '
The court of appeals suggested that, as applied to a section
235(c) summary exclusion, the Eldridge procedural due process bal-
ancing test would encompass the following elements:
(1) the importance to the permanent resident alien and others like
him of not being imprisoned and forced to leave the United States;
(2) the risk that such an alien will erroneously suffer such harm
under the procedure set forth in section 235(c), together with the
likelihood that giving the alien more procedural protections will
reduce that risk; and (3) the interests of the Government, on behalf
of the public, in summarily excluding terrorists and other un-
desirables from our shores and in avoiding the cost of additional
safeguards for permanent resident aliens subject to section 235(c)
exclusion proceedings. 18 2
VI. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
With Rafeedie's right to procedural due process clearly estab-
lished, the remaining issue for analysis is what process will minimally
satisfy constitutional standards under the fifth amendment and Ma-
thews v. Eldridge.18
3
179. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 524 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
180. Since Rafeedie's procedural due process challenge to his summary exclusion came in
the midst of the proceedings, the district court would have to consider both the processes
already afforded Rafeedie, and whether section 235(c), on its face, provides a constitutionally
sufficient amount of procedural due process. Id.
181. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
182. Id. at 525.
183. The district court had not yet issued its decision on remand at the time this Note
went to press.
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A. Private Interests at Stake
The first Eldridge balancing factor according to the court of ap-
peals is "the importance to the permanent resident alien and others
like him of not being imprisoned and forced to leave the United
States."'" Concededly, the losses associated with imprisonment and
permanent banishment from the United States are the greatest losses
for LPRs.18 5 For example, Rafeedie stands to lose the right "to stay
and live and work in this land of freedom[,]' 186 and the right to be
reunited with his family. 18 7 Banishment from the United States
would certainly exact a great cost, taking from Rafeedie "all that
makes life worth living."' 188
However, the court of appeals failed to account for other impor-
tant private interests at stake in Rafeedie's exclusion. Such interests
include: Rafeedie's interest in a favorable determination by immigra-
tion officials of the re-entry question; his substantive due process
rights under the first amendment; and his substantive due process in-
terest to freely travel.
1. The Re-entry Question as a Private Interest
The outcome of the statutory re-entry question may hold enor-
mous significance for any politically active LPR who leaves the
United States and then attempts to return. As a threshold matter, any
inquiry into whether a returning LPR effected a statutory entry re-
quires the INS to make factual determinations in each specific case.1
8 9
The LPR has an interest in having such facts presented to an in-
dependent tribunal for resolution of this issue. An unfavorable result
may subject the alien to diminished statutory procedural rights and
later deportation. 190
In a plenary exclusion hearing, if the immigration judge deter-
184. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 525.
185. Since the INS paroled Rafeedie into the United States, imprisonment holds much less
significance than Rafeedie's ultimate banishment from this country. Since national security is
at issue in a section 235(c) exclusion, other LPRs may not be so fortunate.
186. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
187. In Rafeedie's case, the loss of these interests would work an especially severe hard-
ship as he provided the only source of income for his family. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 518.
188. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
189. The "innocent, casual and brief" test announced in Fleuti is necessarily a fact-laden
inquiry. 374 U.S. 449; see Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 749.
190. In Rafeedie's case, the court of appeals never reached this issue, since it merely held
that Rafeedie was entitled to due process regardless of whether he made a statutory entry.
Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 521.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
mines that the alien effected no entry, the hearing stops. The govern-
ment must then release the alien, as "only 'entering' aliens are subject
to exclusion." 191 The only available alternative is then to expel the
alien from the country by deportation. Although plenary exclusions
provide more procedural protections than summary exclusions, de-
portation proceedings generally offer more procedural protections
than either plenary or summary exclusions.1 92 Further, an entry by a
returning LPR will subject him or her to provisions of law which
make certain conditions or acts committed within five years of entry
deportable offenses. 193
Rafeedie thus has an interest in the outcome of the re-entry ques-
tion. As a returning LPR, he is entitled to due process in the resolu-
tion of this issue.194 This strong private interest demands that the
entry issue be explicitly considered as a private interest of the alien
during any procedural due process balancing.
2. First Amendment Rights as a Private Interest
Although the court of appeals acknowledged that summary ex-
clusion chilled Rafeedie's substantive right to free speech, 195 it failed
to include this interest in its due process calculus. 196 Rafeedie's exclu-
sion may represent an attempt by the government to silence not only
his politically-expressive activities, but also those activities of other
LPRs within the United States. Thus, summary exclusion implicates
191. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 28 (1982); Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 523. "If
(Rafeedie] had never left the United States, the INS would have had to deport him, with the
procedural safeguards such a course would entail." I.
192. Compare INA § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 C.F.R. § 236, with INA § 242, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 and 8 C.F.R. § 242. Although the Supreme Court mandated that certain returning
LPRs receive due process in an exclusion hearing, the process actually received will probably
not exceed that which is statutorily mandated in the section 236 plenary procedure. Plasencia,
459 U.S. at 32.
193. An alien who becomes institutionalized at public expense for a mental defect within
five years of entry may be deported. INA § 241(aX3), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3). An alien may be
deported if "convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after
entry .. " Id. § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4).
194. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 31. "Nor is it in any way 'unfair' to decide the question of
entry in exclusion proceedings as long as those proceedings themselves are fair." Id.
195. It is well settled that the first amendment protects aliens within the United States.
See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (first amendment protects LPR's freedom of
speech); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (first amendment protects LPR's freedom of
speech, press, and association); cf Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (although
same standards governed alien and citizen claims based on the first amendment, deportation of
aliens for membership in Communist party upheld by Court).
196. See supra text accompanying note 182.
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concerns central to freedom of speech, 19 7 and the court of appeals
should have explicitly incorporated Rafeedie's substantive first
amendment interests within the procedural due process equation. 19
Few would disagree that the government has substantial interests
in excluding terrorists, drug dealers, and other aliens whose entries
pose a threat to American life. Nonetheless, without procedural
mechanisms available for the LPR to challenge the basis of the gov-
ernment's exclusion decision, 199 summary exclusion allows the gov-
ernment to exclude an alien without having to prove any substantive
allegations. This gives the government the ability to use summary
exclusion as a tool of censorship and prior restraint 20 on otherwise
protected, LPR expressive activity.
By attempting to summarily exclude Rafeedie, the INS sent an
ominous message of censorship not only to him, but to all LPRs
within the United States who wish to criticize government policies.20 '
The sanction of summary exclusion dissuades LPRs from either
speaking out, or from leaving the country. 20 2 Section 235(c) summary
exclusion gives the government unfettered discretion to impermissibly
"grant the use of a forum to people whose views [it] finds acceptable,
but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more contro-
versial views."12
0 3
197. In the context of a libel suit, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brennan,
regarded the central meaning of the first amendment as the "profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open....
New York Times v. Sullivan Co., 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
198. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970). Pro-
fessor Monaghan argues that when evaluating any procedural safeguards designed to eliminate
censorship, "the Court has placed little reliance upon the due process requirements of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, but instead has turned directly to the first amendment as the
source of the rules." Id.
199. See id. at 519. "Like the substantive rules themselves, insensitive procedures can
'chill' the right of free expression." Id
200. The doctrine of prior restraint is concerned with whether the government may per-
missibly restrict speech prior to its utterance. The doctrine "has its roots in the sixteenth- and
seventeenth century English licensing systems under which all printing presses and printers
were licensed by the state and no book .. . could lawfully be published without the prior
approval of a government censor." G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, M. TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1046 (1986).
201. Summary exclusion could also possibly chill the speech of members of Rafeedie's
immediate family, who might fear that their speech, and not his, could result in his unwar-
ranted, but uncontestable, exclusion.
202. For a discussion of how summary exclusion's chilling effect on speech is related to its
chilling effect on an LPR's interest in international travel, see infra text accompanying notes
208-13.
203. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
205
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Summary exclusion simply amounts to a procedure which may
operate to indirectly prohibit the expression of ideas disagreeable to
the government o4 The law achieves its censorship effect by its inher-
ent insensitivity to the "fragile" first amendment interests of LPRs.205
By not including Rafeedie's first amendment interests as a private in-
terest at stake, the court of appeals ignored the critical need to bal-
ance the strict "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers
of a censorship system" 2°6 against the other Eldridge procedural due
process factors. Therefore, on remand, the district court's procedural
due process balancing will not show "the necessary sensitivity to free-
dom of expression"207 and will improperly tilt in the government's
favor.
3. The LPR's Interest in International Travel
An LPR has a strong interest in his ability to travel across the
nation's borders, free from unreasonable government restriction. 20 8
For citizens, the right to travel is "not a mere conditional liberty sub-
ject to regulation and control under conventional due process or equal
protection standards, . . ." but is rather, "a virtually unconditional
personal right. ' ' 2° 9 For the LPR, "[t]ravel abroad, like travel within
the country ... may be as close to the heart of the individual as the
choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. ' 210 Indeed, as many LPRs
commonly have numerous family members who live abroad, the im-
portance of international travel to maintain family ties cannot be
disputed.
204. "[C]onstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of gov-
ernmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights." Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (citations omitted).
205. Cf. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 (1986) (quoting
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 551 (1970)). "The first
amendment due process cases have shown that first amendment rights are fragile and can be
destroyed by insensitive procedures." Id.
206. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). Although the procedural safeguards
of Freedman addressed censorship efforts against obscenity in motion pictures, concerns
against unfettered censorial discretion apply with even greater force when political speech is at
stake. See Monaghan, supra note 198, at 519.
207. Monaghan, supra note 198, at 519.
208. It is understandable that Rafeedie did not raise this issue, as he had already com-
pleted his trip abroad. But it is necessary to analyze the due process issues "not merely with
reference to a single case, but having in mind the type of case it is, with regard to the run of
such cases." Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 524.
209. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1378 (1988) (quoting Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642-43 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
210. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
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The threat of exclusion without procedural due process could
force LPRs who actively criticize the government to either speak out
and never leave the country, or remain silent to avoid sacrificing the
ability to freely travel abroad. Although such methods of influence
may exist elsewhere,211 they remain abhorrent in our free system. As
long as the possibility of arbitrary exclusion exists, politically active
LPRs may simply forego their rights to free speech and foreign
travel. 212
United States laws which explicitly regulate alien travel generally
do not unreasonably burden the alien's desire to freely travel
abroad. 213 The courts should take a different view in judging a law
which allows the government to arbitrarily restrict LPR travel as a
method to censor otherwise protected speech. With respect to sum-
mary exclusion, the LPR's strong interest in international travel and
the right to free speech become two sides of the same constitutional
coin. Both must be considered together as part of Rafeedie's private
interests in the procedural due process balance.
B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The structural trappings of summary exclusion-its built-in se-
crecy and exclusive control by the INS-make the risk of an errone-
ous exclusion a plausible outcome. Since the LPR cannot obtain
information regarding the reason for a summary exclusion decision,
the risk of politically-motivated or vindictive INS officials excluding
LPRs for irrational reasons presents a credible and unreasonable
threat. Even one of the INA's original sponsors recognized such a
possibility. 21
4
211. "Free movement by the citizen is of course as dangerous to a tyrant as free expression
of ideas or the right of assembly and it is therefore controlled in most countries in the interests
of security." Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519 (1964) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). The same reasoning applies with equal force to the LPR.
212. The Aptheker Court noted that for citizens, "freedom of travel is a constitutional
liberty closely related to rights of free speech and association." Id. at 517.
213. See, e.g., INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (travel control of citizens and aliens); INA
§ 223, 8 U.S.C. § 1203 (re-entry permits); INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (effect of travel on alien
naturalization); 8 C.F.R. § 215 (controls of aliens departing the United States).
214. During hearings discussing section 235(c), Representative Walter remarked that
"[t]he thing that disturbs all of us is the possibility of some immigration inspector acting capri-
ciously or arbitrarily, and there being nobody that can review the life and death decisions that
they can make." Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws: Hearings on
S. 716 Before the Special Subcomm. to Investigate Immigration and Nationality of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 283 (1951) [hereinafter Hearings]. The Acting Commis-
sioner responded by noting that the Attorney General reviews such cases. Id. This simply
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For example, in a plenary exclusion hearing, the INS must pro-
duce sufficient evidence to prove the LPR had re-entered the United
States. 215 However, summary exclusion removes this burden from the
INS. If the INS can exclude an LPR who voices non-mainstream
political viewpoints without having to prove any of its allegations, it
will clearly desire to proceed from the assumption, rather than from
an objective finding, that the LPR has re-entered the country. Under
these circumstances, the risk of the INS making an erroneous deter-
mination of the entry question becomes an almost certain result.
The due process issue presents an additional problem of objectiv-
ity. The same agency that investigates the alien also prosecutes him
and passes judgment on his future. 216 Any facts supporting exclusion
will be weighed in favor of that outcome. Even if such facts would be
insufficient to persuade an immigration judge to exclude the alien, the
secrecy of summary exclusion, combined with its lack of accountabil-
ity, encourages INS officials to exclude the alien. Summary exclusion,
in equivalent criminal proceedings, would entail an accused criminal
pleading his case in writing before a police desk sergeant, who then
would pass judgment and sentence the criminal. Thus, section 235(c)
summary exclusion does not encourage objective, fair findings.21 7
C. The Government's Interests
Next, the government's interests in a summary exclusion pro-
ceeding must be examined under the Eldridge balancing test. This
evaluation illustrates the tension between Rafeedie's private interests
and the government's interests in summarily excluding LPRs.
The government utilizes alien exclusion as one method of pro-
tecting the nation's sovereignty 218 and as "a weapon of defense and
ignores the due process requirements of impartial review. See infra text accompanying notes
288-316.
215. See supra text accompanying note 80.
216. The chain of events beginning with an alien's temporary exclusion by an immigration
inspector end after the INS district director forwards the case to the regional commissioner,
who decides whether or not to exclude the alien. See supra text accompanying notes 70-86.
217. The INS's assertion that Rafeedie's due process rights turn on allegations of foreign
activities which are prejudicial to United States security interests, illustrates the problem. See
Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 523. The court of appeals reasoned that "the Government's position...
is at war with the fundamental purpose of the due process guarantee. The Government cannot
assert as an argument against procedural safeguards that the accused is guilty as charged." Id.
at 523-24.
218. The Supreme Court recently noted that the government's weighty interest in the "effi-
cient administration of the immigration laws at the border .... " is a matter "largely within
the control of the executive and the legislature." Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
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reprisal" in conducting foreign relations.219 Aliens who are genuine
terrorists obviously operate surreptitiously. To root them out, the
government must, to some degree, shroud its investigative and intelli-
gence-gathering activities in secrecy. Extensive materials are derived
from confidential sources associated with diplomatic and consular es-
tablishments; thus, "[d]isclosure of these materials, and their sources,
would not only hamper the future work of the missions abroad, but
would also place many of the sources in personal jeopardy.
'220
Therefore, in conducting its foreign relations, the government has a
legitimate interest in not disclosing such confidential information.
221
Any disclosure of such confidential information may require co-
ordination among the various agencies of the executive branch. To
promote effective investigation and law enforcement, each agency
often shares confidential information. For agency A to disclose any
intelligence and investigative reports furnished by agency B, agency A
may have to secure specific approval in advance of any release from
agency B.222 Blatant disregard for agency needs could breed intra-
branch rivalries which diminish effective law enforcement.
Similarly, broad disclosure of classified materials may also ham-
per federal law enforcement. Disclosure of the identity of actual per-
sons under investigation, and what the government knows about
them, could "be of inestimable service to foreign agencies. ' 223 Such
exposure may allow those under investigation to take counter-meas-
ures to defeat or impede law enforcement functions. The government
must also consider whether disclosure of information originally
gained in confidence224 would jeopardize the future utility and well-
being of federal informants.
225
These concerns present legitimate reasons for guarding against
unwarranted disclosure of confidential information. On the other
hand, the current laws allow the government to trample the LPR's
219. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952).
220. Communist Activities in Alien and National Groups: Hearings Before the Special Sub-
comm. to Investigate Immigration and Naturalization of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1949) (letter from James E. Webb, acting Secretary of State, to Senator
Pat McCarran, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter Letter].
221. Compare Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 365 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
use of confidential information).
222. See Letter, supra note 220, at 171.
223. Id. at 172.
224. Id. "[M]uch ... information is given in confidence and can only be obtained upon
pledge not to disclose its sources." Id.
225. Id.
209
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procedural due process rights in the name of protecting confidential
information. As a result, an LPR may lose his or her due process
rights upon a mere invocation of national security concerns, even if
only minimally implicated in the alien's exclusion. The following sec-
tions address possible methods of reconciling these competing
interests.
D. Additional Procedural Safeguards
1. Notice
Adequate notice to the party whose life, liberty and property are
to be deprived has long been a requirement of constitutional fair-
ness,226 as it provides one of the most effective safeguards against an
erroneous deprivation of liberty. Important factors to consider are
whether the notice is sufficiently timely,227 and whether notice has
"clariflied] what the charges are in a manner adequate to apprise the
individual of the basis for the government's proposed action."
228 Jus-
tice Frankfurter observed that "[n]o better instrument has been de-
vised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious
loss notice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet it."
'229
Summary exclusion flouts the due process requirement of basic
notice. Federal regulations merely specify that "the alien shall be no-
tified by personal service of Form 1-147 of the action taken and the
right to make written representations. ' 230 The Form 1-147 served on
Rafeedie alleged excludability based on confidential information, and
set forth additional factual accusations. 23' However, this notice was
meaningless since the INS sought to exclude Rafeedie on the basis of
the confidential information, not on the basis of the disclosed factual
allegations. 232 Without notice of the factual basis for the govern-
226. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). "[A]t a
minimum, [due process] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property... be preceded
by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Id.; see also
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (due process requires "timely and adequate
notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination" of welfare benefits).
227. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 39 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Notice must
be provided sufficiently in advance of the hearing to 'give the charged party a chance to mar-
shal the facts in his defense.' " Id.
228. Id. (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974)).
229. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
230. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8 (1989).
231. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 734; see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
232. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 518. The court of appeals noted that a section 236 exclusion
proceeding can make Rafeedie aware of the factual allegations against him.
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ment's case, Rafeedie was unable to prepare an adequate defense. The
requirement of adequate notice would help to cure these defects.
2. Adequate Hearing with Full Disclosure
The Supreme Court long recognized that a fair hearing provides
an effective check on the exercise of arbitrary deportations by the gov-
ernment. 233 The concept that "openness of judicial proceedings serves
to preserve both the appearance and the reality of fairness in the adju-
dication of United States courts" 234 applies with equal force to exclu-
sion proceedings. The importance of the rights to be determined in an
exclusion hearing mandates that an adequate hearing encompass
some elements of confrontation and cross-examination.
235
The excludability of an alien based on INA sections 212(a)(27)
through 212(a)(29) often turns on disputed facts. For example,
Rafeedie could rebut a finding that his entry would be prejudicial to
the United States by subjecting the factual basis of such a conclusion
to rigorous cross-examination. In this manner, unfounded rumor,
witnesses with bias and memory lapses, and unreliable informants
would be carefully scrutinized. 2
36
Furthermore, facts supporting excludability on the basis of un-
233. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903). The Court stated:
[I]t is not competent for.., any executive officer ... arbitrarily to cause an alien,
who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction
... to be ... deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the
questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No such arbi-
trary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are
recognized.
Id.
234. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987);
see also United States ex rel. Kasel De Pagliera v. Savoretti, 139 F. Supp. 143, 146 (S.D. Fla.
1956) ("The sunshine of publicity keeps government rational, lawful and just.").
235. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). "In almost every setting where impor-
tant decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses." Id. At least where Congress or the Executive have not
explicitly authorized denial of a hearing, this principle is "immutable." Greene v. McElroy,
360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); see also Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U.S. 292
(1937) (decision based on "the strength of information secretly collected and never ... dis-
closed" violated due process); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96,
103 (1963) ("[P]rocedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of
those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood.").
236. A public hearing eventually remedied a great injustice allowed by the Court in United
States ex reL Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Ellen Knauff married an American
serviceman during World War II, but she was summarily excluded as a "risk to national secur-
ity" under the regulatory predecessor of section 235(c). Id. at 541. The Court upheld her
exclusion, as she was a first-time entrant with no due process rights. Id. at 546. After enor-
mous pressure, the INS granted her a hearing, which revealed the "confidential information"
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protected speech, or membership in terrorist organizations, may not
pass constitutional muster during a hearing. The Supreme Court has
historically drawn a distinction between express advocacy of unlawful
action and abstract doctrine. 237 A hearing that focuses on specific ex-
amples of Rafeedie's speech 238 could determine whether exclusion
amounts to censorship or appropriately bars a dangerous person from
entry.239 Although membership in, or affiliation with prohibited orga-
nizations is an excludable offense, a hearing would allow the alien to
constitutionally challenge such criteria.24° In short, a hearing could
uncover a subjective, illegal government intent to exclude Rafeedie on
the basis of constitutionally protected activity. Only a hearing can
adequately test the credibility and veracity of the government's
assertions.
Unquestionably, section 235(c) falls far short of giving the alien a
fair hearing because it simply allows for written submissions. Written
submissions are inadequate as they do not permit the recipient to
mold his argument to the issues the decision-maker considers impor-
tant.241 Particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue, writ-
ten submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. 242
as nothing more than rumors generated by a jilted ex-lover of her husband. See E. KNAUFF,
THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY XV-XVI (1952).
237. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 545 (1951). "Throughout our decisions
there has recurred a distinction between the statement of an idea which may prompt its hearers
to take unlawful action, and advocacy that such action be taken." Id.; Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 324-25 (1957). "The essential distinction is that those to whom the advocacy is
addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in
something." Id.
238. See Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 753 (1975) (In first amendment cases
Justice Harlan "insisted on strict statutory standards of proof emphasizing . . . actual
speech.").
239. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The government may not "for-
bid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." Id. (footnote omitted).
240. Mere membership in an organization, without more, is an insufficient constitutional
basis on which to exclude an LPR. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. at 752 (citing Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)). Even at the height of the Cold War, the Supreme Court
supported this idea, stating that "evidence of membership plus personal activity in supporting
and extending the [Communist] Party's philosophy concerning violence gives adequate ground
for detention." Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541 (1952) (emphasis added). Instead, the
government must shoulder "the burden of establishing a knowing affiliation with an organiza-
tion possessing unlawful aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims."
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
241. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
242. Id.; see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697 (1979) ("written submissions are
212
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An evidentiary-type hearing is one remedy to the problem; it
would allow Rafeedie to present favorable testimony and refute ad-
verse evidence. To be fair and effective, such a hearing must encom-
pass some degree of cross-examination. 243 It should allow the LPR to
be represented by counsel and require the INS to prove its case2 " by
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged...
are true. '2 45 Fair hearing procedures also would require an independ-
ent tribunal246 to render an explanation of the ultimate decision, based
solely on the record. An exclusion hearing with such elements would
minimize the risk of an erroneous deprivation of an LPR's liberty.
3. Adequate Hearing Utilizing In Camera Procedures
Unquestionably, exclusion hearings that require the government
to fully disclose its case would greatly protect the alien against arbi-
trary and capricious government action. On the other hand, such
hearings could compromise legitimate national security concerns. A
reasonable approach to reconciling these competing interests should
not vindicate the rights of one party and completely ignore the rights
of the other. Jay v. Boyd247 may represent the seeds of such a
compromise.
In Jay, an LPR who resided in the United States for twenty-four
years was ordered deported for his five years of membership in the
Communist party.248 The LPR applied for relief from the Attorney
General, who had discretionary power to suspend the deportation.249
At a later hearing, an immigration judge found the LPR to have met
a particularly inappropriate way to distinguish a genuine hard luck story from a fabricated tall
tale").
243. If an in camera procedure is necessary to protect confidential information, the trier of
fact, or possibly an advocate ad litem, must assume such a protective role. See infra text
accompanying notes 257-87.
244. The government bears the burden of proof in exclusion hearings. See Kwong Hai
Chew v. Rogers, 257 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
245. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). Although the Supreme Court mandated
this standard of proof for deportation, the Court's reasoning applies equally to an LPR's exclu-
sion. Id. at 285. "This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic deprivations that may
follow when a resident of this country is compelled by our Government to forsake all the
bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary identifica-
tion." Id.
246. See infra text accompanying notes 288-316.
247. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
248. Id. at 348.
249. The Attorney General could, in his discretion, "suspend deportation of any deport-
able alien who [met] certain statutory requirements relating to moral character, hardship and
period of residence within the United States. Id. at 351.
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the "statutory prerequisites to the favorable exercise of the discretion-
ary relief," but denied the requested suspension on the basis of undis-
closed, confidential information.
2so
The Supreme Court rejected the LPR's procedural due process
challenge to the government's use of undisclosed, confidential infor-
mation. 251 The Court framed the question as "not whether an alien is
deportable, but whether, as a deportable alien who is qualified for sus-
pension of deportation, he should be granted such suspension. ' 252
The Court concluded that discretionary relief from deportation was
"gratuitous. ' 253 The LPR, therefore, was not entitled to full disclo-
sure of the government's case.
254
The primary importance of Jay rests in the Supreme Court's
willingness, albeit under limited circumstances, to allow the use of
undisclosed, confidential information in a deportation-related pro-
ceeding. 255 But unlike the gratuitous relief sought in Jay, the unre-
strained use of confidential information to deprive an LPR of
protected liberty interests raises serious procedural due process con-
cerns. In order to pass muster under the fifth amendment, any exclu-
sion procedure using confidential information must have built-in
features which not only protect against the dangers associated with
confidential information, but also eliminate the appearance of govern-
ment arbitrariness. 256
250. Id. at 349.
251. Id. at 358-60.
252. Jay, 351 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added).
253. Id. On this point, summary exclusion is distinguishable. Rafeedie requested relief
from a procedure to determine his excludability; such relief hardly can be characterized as
"gratuitous." However, this point does not necessarily bar the use of confidential information
in exclusion proceedings. It merely indicates a need for procedures that protect against the
abuses associated with the use of undisclosed information.
254. Id. at 360-61.
255. Id. at 348-49. The Court maintained that "[i]f the statute permits any withholding of
information from the alien, manifestly this is a reasonable class of cases in which to exercise
that power." Id. at 358. The Court construed 8 C.F.R. § 244.3 (1952), which allowed such
use of confidential information. The lack of a modem day equivalent to this regulation could
signify executive recognition of the possible abuses associated with undisclosed confidential
information. However, such recognition does not seem to have reached summary exclusions.
256. In Jay, some of these dangers were outlined:
No nation can remain true to the ideal of liberty under law and at the same time
permit people to have their homes destroyed and their lives blasted by the slurs of
unseen and unsworn informers. There is no possible way to contest the truthfulness
of anonymous accusations. The supposed accuser can neither be identified nor inter-
rogated. He may be the most worthless and irresponsible character in the commu-
nity. What he said may be wholly malicious, untrue, unreliable, or inaccurately
reported.
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In camera review25 7 may provide such a solution. Such a proce-
dure could efficiently preserve the adversarial process when the gov-
ernment seeks to exclude an LPR on the basis of confidential
information. While avoiding the harms inherent in the use of confi-
dential information, in camera review is one method of protecting the
government's interest in non-disclosure.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals outlined the
prerequisites for a court to dispose of the merits of a case on the basis
of ex parte, in camera submissions: 258 "[A] proper invocation of the
privilege; a demonstration of compelling national security concerns;
and public disclosure by the government, prior to any in camera ex-
amination, of as much of the material as it could divulge without
compromising the privilege." 25 9 As an initial procedural matter, then,
in camera review seeks to identify any information which does not
merit secrecy. 26° Such scrutiny certainly would deter the government
from improperly invoking its confidentiality privilege to avoid proving
excludability.
261
In this first procedural step of determining whether the privilege
against disclosure should apply, the standard of review becomes a
critical issue. In Kleindienst v. Mandel,262 the Supreme Court ruled
that when the executive provides a "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason" for excluding an alien, a court may "neither look behind the
exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification
against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal com-
351 U.S. 345, 365 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting).
Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1988), illustrates a different sort of danger. The
widow of ex-Chilean President Allende had sought to enter the United States to deliver various
speeches. The government argued her presence in this country would harm foreign policy and
excluded her. A partially declassified government affidavit, however, revealed the govern-
ment's real concern to be impermissibly centered "over the anticipated content of her proposed
speeches on the basis of prior speeches." Id. at 1121.
257. "In camera" inspection occurs when a trier of fact "inspect[s] a document which
counsel wishes to use at trial in his chambers before ruling on its admissibility or its use."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 684 (5th ed. 1979).
258. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
259. Id. at 1061 (emphasis added).
260. It is appropriate for a court to resolve disputed issues of privilege in camera. Halkin
v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S.
394, 405-06 (1976)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-15 (1974); United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
261. Cf. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880, 888 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated, 785 F.2d
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (judicial scrutiny will deter a "mushrooming of
exclusions based on [INA § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)] and content-based denials.").
262. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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munication with the applicant.'263 However, the Kleindienst standard
of review was not intended for, and should not be applied to, in cam-
era proceedings where the LPR's own liberty interests are at stake.
Kleindienst arose out of the exclusion of a nonimmigrant scholar
who, as an initial entrant into the United States, had no protected
liberty interest in entry.264 The alien did not contest his exclusion.
Instead, a group of university professors brought suit and asserted
that their first amendment rights were violated. 265 In contrast, sum-
mary exclusion of a returning LPR puts his liberty at risk, the pen-
dency of which chills the LPR's own first amendment rights. In short,
the Kleindienst standard gives far too much deference to the execu-
tive. 266 Even if the standard is appropriate for nonimmigrant aliens, a
more rigorous standard of review267 should apply when exclusion
jeopardizes the significant liberty interests of a returning LPR.
The second procedural hurdle for the government to overcome in
an in camera proceeding should be to make a prima facie showing of
compelling national security interests. In a criminal proceeding, if the
government meets this burden and its confidential information is rele-
vant to the merits of the case, the government must disclose or dis-
miss. 268 Convicting an individual of a crime on the basis of
undisclosed information is a denial of basic procedural due process.
269
263. Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 762.
265. Id. at 759-60.
266. Courts applying the standard generally defer to the executive. Many past invocations
of privilege based on military or state secrets have resulted in overly deferential court rulings.
See generally Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege.- Protection for the National Secur-
ity or Immunity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570 (1982). But see Allende v. Shultz, 605 F.
Supp. 1220, 1225 (D. Mass. 1985) (court refused to examine confidential documents in camera
as the court found no "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for excluding Allende).
267. Eg., Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights v. INS, 721 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Plaintiffs brought suit under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West
Supp. 1989), to force the government to disclose information relating to the exclusion of a
Columbian journalist under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(26), (27) and (28). The court enumerated the
following as factors to consider in deciding whether to conduct an in camera inspection of
confidential materials: (a) judicial economy, (b) the conclusory nature of the agency affidavits,
(c) bad faith on the part of the agency, (d) disputes concerning the contents of the documents,
(e) whether the agency requests an in camera inspection, and (f) the strong public interest in
disclosure. Id. at 566. The court held that affidavits purporting to support non-disclosure on
national security grounds were insufficient, noting that "[b]oilerplate descriptions such as 'con-
fidential information from a confidential source' do not sufficiently demonstrate that confiden-
tial information would invariably identify an informant." Id. at 565-66.
268. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 191-94 (1969); Tigar, Judicial Power, the
"Political Question Doctrine, "and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1176-78 (1970).
269. In Alderman, the government conceded that due process required disclosure of classi-
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Although exclusion is not a criminal proceeding,270 the consequences
are sufficiently severe that similar fifth amendment due process stan-
dards should apply.
27'
Accordingly, the government's demonstration of compelling na-
tional security interests must be made in the context of asking
whether grievous harm to the national security would likely result by
not excluding the LPR.272 The inquiry should focus exclusively on
whether the LPR poses a direct threat to the physical security or
safety of the United States. The significant liberty interests of the
LPR at stake in an exclusion proceeding demand nothing less.
The government cannot simply rely upon an amorphous, specu-
lative harm to national security.273 Threats to national security based
upon revealing the identity of foreign operatives or exposing intelli-
gence gathering methods present legitimate concerns. However, such
concerns are insufficiently compelling to justify using confidential in-
formation to deprive an LPR of a protected liberty interest. Due pro-
cess favors dismissal under these circumstances. Quite simply, the
government satisfactorily protects its intelligence capabilities by fore-
going exclusion of an LPR who poses no direct threat to the national
well-being.
In Rafeedie's case, the government has not demonstrated such
compelling national security interests. By paroling Rafeedie into the
country, 274 the government conceded that such action was "strictly in
the public interest, ' 275 and that he was unlikely to "pose a security
risk."' 27 6 In spite of its confidential information, the INS did not re-
fled surveillance records which were relevant to deciding the merits of the case. 394 U.S. at
191.
270. Cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952). "Deportation, however se-
vere its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than criminal proce-
dure." Id
271. See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951). The Court acknowledged
the civil nature of deportation, but applied the due process vagueness doctrine (normally re-
served for criminal matters) due to the "grave nature of deportation." Id.
272. Cf United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) (Hand, J.). In a criminal
case, "the prosecution must decide whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go
unpublished [is] greater than the disclosure of such 'state secrets' as might be relevant to the
defence [sic]." Id. at 638.
273. Cf Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 199 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In criminal cases, Justice Harlan would "lay upon trial judges the
affirmative duty of assuring themselves that the national security interests claimed to justify an
in camera proceeding are real and not merely colorable." Id.
274. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
275. INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(a).
276. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(c) (1989).
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verse those findings.277 Under these circumstances, the government
apparently invoked a speculative and dubious claim of national secur-
ity in order to fill evidentiary gaps in its case.278 Therefore, due pro-
cess weighs in favor of disallowing the use of confidential information
to summarily exclude Rafeedie.
However, in the extraordinary case where the government has
demonstrated that grievous harm to the national security would result
by not excluding an LPR, the government should not be faced with an
absolute choice of disclosure or dismissal. Procedural due process
modeled after the rights of criminal defendants should not mechani-
cally compel that choice in an exclusion proceeding. Instead, the in-
quiry should focus on tailoring a procedure which could reasonably
accommodate both the government's interest in non-disclosure and
the LPR's interest in notice, confrontation and cross-examination.
Such a procedure would balance the relevant competing interests and
substantially comport with the underlying goals of procedural due
process.
Standard in camera proceedings, which prohibit participation by
the LPR, do not provide an adequate procedural answer. While a
tribunal sitting in camera would protect the government and would
provide significant protection against unwarranted exclusions, the
LPR still could not fully prepare or conduct his defense. Further-
more, a disinterested trier of fact may not be able to effectively advo-
cate and adjudicate the LPR's cause. 279
Modified in camera procedures may offer a solution. An advo-
cate ad litem, 2 0 appointed by the tribunal for the sole purpose of rep-
resenting the LPR during the in camera proceedings, could allow the
LPR to adequately prepare and conduct a defense. Full disclosure
would be made to an advocate/agent acting on behalf of the LPR.
Despite the fact that the LPR would never personally discover the
government's confidential information, his or her fully informed ad-
vocate could virtually eliminate the procedural due process deficien-
277. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment at 31, Rafeedie v. INS, No. 88-0366-JHG (D.D.C. 1990).
278. Cf United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (1950). "It is. .. one thing to allow
the privileged person to suppress the evidence, and.. . another thing to allow him to fill a gap
in his own evidence by recourse to what he suppresses." Id.
279. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183-84 (1969).
280. "A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed to prosecute or defend a suit on behalf
of a party incapacitated by infancy or otherwise." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 40 (5th ed.
1979).
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cies associated with an ex parte, in camera proceeding. 28'
For example, an advocate ad litem would allow the trier of fact
to assume a completely neutral, disinterested position. Such an advo-
cate also gives the LPR an effective tool for confronting the govern-
ment's classified information. Additionally, this modified in camera
procedure would also minimize the tribunal's need to agonize over
whether extremely sensitive material should be disclosed. 28 2
It may not be easy to find an advocate for the defense who can
simultaneously maintain his or her duty to the government. The tri-
bunal could simply utilize the LPR's existing counsel and issue a pro-
tective order.28 3  Unfortunately, such an order may provide
insufficient assurance against unwarranted disclosure.2 4 Perhaps an
advocate appointed from the Federal Public Defender's office, on the
other hand, could reasonably be expected to comply with a protective
order.28 5 Appointing a lawyer who is also, at least nominally, a fed-
eral employee has another possible advantage: the government argua-
bly would be more willing to fully and accurately disclose its
information to one of its own employees.
28 6
281. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183-84 (1969) (discussing in camera
due process deficiencies). The burdens on a trial judge, typically associated with in camera
procedures, also would be substantially alleviated.
282. Courts generally defer to executive decisions relating to national security for a wide
variety of reasons, including separation of powers and the executive's expertise. See generally
Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 1 (1948) (judiciary should
not review executive decisions which require evaluating secret information and political conse-
quences); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972). "The courts[] ... are ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign
intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy classifications .... Id.
283. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 185 (1969) (When confidential matters
must be disclosed to a criminal defendant and his counsel, a protective order may be
appropriate.).
284. For example, Justice Harlan asserted the following:
It is one thing to believe that the normal criminal defendant will refuse to pass on
information if threatened with severe penalties for unauthorized disclosure. It is
quite another thing to believe that a defendant who is probably a spy will not pass on
to the foreign power any additional information he has received.
Id. at 198. In Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the plaintiffs alleged that govern-
mental agencies had illegally intercepted international communications, and sought to have
confidential information produced for trial. The type of concern voiced by Justice Harlan
prompted the court to not allow plaintiff's counsel to participate during in camera proceed-
ings. Id. at 7-8.
285. One expects a highly trained government employee to have a greater sense of aware-
ness of the consequences surrounding the indiscriminate disclosure of protected jnformation.
A background check, conducted on a voluntary basis, would give an even greater measure of
reliability.
286. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 n.21 (1974), the Court indicated the
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However, there are inherent, practical difficulties with this ap-
proach. By not allowing the LPR himself to respond to the confiden-
tial information, the effectiveness of the advocate's defense may be
somewhat impaired. Additionally, the advocate would have to recon-
cile the possible ethical dilemma of arguably representing both the
government and the LPR, two clients with adverse interests.
In spite of these potential shortcomings, having an advocate ad
litem present during in camera proceedings accords the LPR suffi-
cient procedural protections to satisfy the underlying objectives of
traditional due process. It is true that in camera proceedings of this
type do not fit neatly into accepted conceptual outlines of procedural
due process. However, the hallmark of due process is its flexibility. 2 7
All that is lost through these proceedings, therefore, is a ritualistic
adherence to formalism, not meaningful protection for the LPR. In
short, the procedure affords the LPR an effective protection against
arbitrary and capricious government action. Fundamentally, that is
all that the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires.
4. Independent Tribunal
In camera review will not protect the LPR unless it is conducted
by an independent tribunal. Despite the Supreme Court's "presump-
tion in favor of impartiality in administrative hearings irrespective of
some overlap of adjudicative, prosecutorial and investigative func-
tion, ' '288 summary exclusion's complete overlap of such functions
makes "the risk of unfairness intolerably high." 289 This degree of risk
distinguishes Withrow v. Larkin,29 the Supreme Court case which set
forth the presumption of agency impartiality.
In Withrow, a state medical disciplinary board investigating a
physician conducted a "final investigative session," and then tempo-
rarily suspended his license.29' The board later filed an action with
the local district attorney for permanent revocation. 292 The Court
found no due process violation, and set forth the rule creating a pre-
Special Prosecutor, himself an employee of the government, could be included in the in camera
proceedings.
287. Cf Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (due
process as a practical concept).
288. Jonal Corp. v. Dist. of Columbia, 533 F.2d 1192, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 825 (1976).
289. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1974).
290. 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1974).
291. Id. at 39-41, 46.
292. Id. at 42.
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sumption in favor of administrative impartiality.
293
The strict applicability of Withrow is doubtful when applied to
summary exclusion laws. The Withrow Court noted that "counsel ac-
tually attended the hearings and knew the facts presented to the
Board."294 The Court stated that "no issue [was] raised concerning
the circumstances, if any, in which the Board could suspend a license
without first holding an adversary hearing."' 29" Significantly, the
board in Withrow had no authority to revoke the license-it had to
resort to the adversarial process to do so. 296 In contrast, section
235(c), in its present form, does not allow for counsel and cannot be
characterized as adversarial. 297 Additionally, summary exclusion will
likely result in permanent deprivation of liberty interests, not merely
the temporary suspension of the right to practice a profession.298
Summary exclusion suffers from the same flaw discussed by the
Court in In re Murchison,299 in which a state judge acted as a "one
man grand jury" by extensively interrogating a suspect about alleged
gambling. The judge charged the suspect with perjury, and later tried
and convicted him for criminal contempt.3 ° Noting that "[it would
be very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to act as a
grand jury and then try the very persons accused as a result of his
investigations," the Court struck down the procedure as a violation of
due process.
30
The Attorney General, or more likely, the regional commis-
sioner, represents section 235(c)'s "one-man grand jury."30 2 He con-
ducts the investigation, renders judgment (i.e. exercises his discretion)
and has the power to exclude (i.e. convict). As the primary partici-
293. Id. at 55 (citing U.S. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)). In order to show an
unconstitutional risk of bias due to the combination of adjudicatory and investigative functions
in one agency, Larkin requires a litigant to "overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity
in those serving as adjudicators; and ...that ...conferring investigative and adjudicative
powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the prac-
tice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented." Id at
47.
294. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added).
295. Id. at 40 n.3, n.4.
296. Id.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
298. Compare Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (pre-revocation hearing not required for
a temporary suspension of passport for reasons of national security).
299. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
300. Id. at 134-35.
301. Id. at 137, 139.
302. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b) (1988).
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pant in the process of exclusion, the Attorney General or regional
commissioner "cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disin-
terested in" the entry or exclusion of the LPR.30 3 Section 235(c)'s
consolidation of investigative and adjudicative powers in one author-
ity thus makes unfairness and bias not only a possibility, but a
probability which the courts must endeavor to prevent. 3
°4
In general, a basic requirement of procedural due process is a
"fair trial in a fair tribunal. ' 305 This requirement applies with equal
force to administrative agencies with adjudicatory duties.3° 6 How-
ever, the Supreme Court, in Marcello v. Bonds,30 held that the combi-
nation of adjudicatory and investigatory functions in special inquiry
officers did not deny due process to an alien in deportation
proceedings.
°30
In Marcello, the Court found immigration judges to be suffi-
ciently impartial, objective and independent of the INS to satisfy min-
imum requirements of due process. 3° 9 The Court's conclusion seems
uncontroversial when viewed in terms of exclusions and deportations
where the government does not rely on undisclosed confidential infor-
mation. However, in the narrow circumstances of an in camera pro-
ceeding, immigration judges would not be sufficiently independent of
the Attorney General to satisfy due process.
Immigration judges derive their authority from the Attorney
General, 310 who alone provides the framework in which immigration
303. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
304. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 47. In Rafeedie, the court noted that INS officials who impose
section 235(c) summary proceedings first consult with the General Counsel of the INS. 880
F.2d at 516. Such consultation will result in "no practical possibility that the Regional Com-
missioner will take a legal position inconsistent with that adopted by the 'chief legal officer' of
the INS." Id.
305. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 46. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)
("[Mlinimum requirements of due process ... include.., a 'neutral and detached' hearing
body."); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950) modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950)
("When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a tribunal which
meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality.").
306. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 46; see also Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 265 (D.C.
Cir. 1962) ("[T]he investigative as well as the prosecuting arm of [an administrative] agency
must be kept separate from the decisional function.").
307. 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
308. Id. at 311.
309. The Court specifically noted that INA section 242(b) "prohibits [a special inquiry
officer] ... from hearing cases which he has taken some part in investigating or prosecuting.
... " Marcello, 349 U.S. at 305-06 (emphasis added). Today, immigration judges are more
insulated from INS influence. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
310. 8 C.F.R. § 3.0 (1989).
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judges conduct exclusion and deportation proceedings.31 Attorney
General decisions, including those to withhold confidential informa-
tion, are binding on immigration judges.3 12 Clearly, immigration
judges are not sufficiently autonomous within the Justice Department
to be allowed to review confidential information in camera.
The current structure within the Justice Department is thus con-
stitutionally inadequate to permit in camera proceedings, and leaves
the district court with few options. The court could require the At-
torney General to file summary exclusion actions directly with a fed-
eral judge, designated on an ad hoc basis.313 Alternatively, the court
could require the Attorney General to designate a small cadre of spe-
cially trained and qualified immigration judges to hear exclusion cases
based on confidential information.314 Significant limitations on the
Attorney General's removal powers would be necessary to ensure the
judge's autonomy. 315 Finally, the court could simply declare sum-
mary procedures unconstitutional, thereby leaving the appropriate
remedy to Congress. 316
E. The Government's Interest in Avoiding the Additional
Safeguards
The final remaining issue involves the government's interest "in
avoiding the cost of additional safeguards for permanent resident
311. Id. § 3.10.
312. Id. § 3.1 (1989); INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c).
313. The government makes relatively few exclusion efforts based upon ideological or na-
tional security grounds. See infra, note 323. Almost no exclusion efforts are made with confi-
dential information used against LPRs. Therefore, appointing a federal judge to hear such
cases would result in no addition to a "governmental structure of great and growing complex-
ity." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 50 (1974) (quoting Richardson v. Perules, 402 U.S. 389,
410 (1971)).
314. This option's distinct advantage would be in keeping the confidential information
within the executive branch. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425,
444 (1977). "[Ilt is clearly less intrusive to place custody and screening of [potentially confi-
dential] materials within the Executive Branch itself than to have Congress or some outside
agency perform the screening function." Id.
315. For example, a "good cause" restriction on the Attorney General's removal power
would not "impermissibly burden[ ] the President's power to control or supervise" the execu-
tion of immigration laws. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988); see also Roberts,
Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 21 (1980)
(proposed removal standards for judges in an article I immigration court).
316. Proposals for the creation of article I, immigration tribunals to hear exclusion and
deportation cases have not persuaded Congress to act. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 315; Fal-
Ion, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916
(1988).
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aliens subject to [section] 235(c) exclusion proceedings."317 From an
economic standpoint, section 235(c) provides the government with a
cost-effective exclusion option. The law permits exclusion based on
unproven allegations. However, if procedural due process requires
the government to prove rather than simply allege its case, investiga-
tions must necessarily become more lengthy, complicated and costly.
Intra-agency coordination and cooperation becomes a significant is-
sue, both in terms of initial investigations and later disclosures to the
alien. 3 1
8
If the INS must allocate more resources toward proving exclud-
ability, other agency functions could experience fiscal shortfalls. 319 In
view of the escalating federal budget deficit, the INS can hardly ex-
pect to receive a greater budget allowance. Further, the necessary
additional investigation time might diminish efficiency at the border
due to increased detention periods for those LPRs whom the Attor-
ney General decides not to parole into the country. Longer detention
periods further increase costs. However, such additional fiscal bur-
dens can be justified in light of summary exclusion's procedural due
process failings, and the private interests at stake.
F The Procedural Due Process Balance
The foregoing discussion illustrated the tension between
Rafeedie's interests and the government's counter-interests. Rafeedie,
and similarly situated LPRs, have compelling interests at stake in ex-
clusion.3 20 On the other hand, it is possible for the government to
present a credible case against disclosing confidential information.3 21
But even in the name of national security, summary exclusion, in its
present form, unreasonably permits an erroneous, absolute depriva-
tion of the LPR's private interests.3 22 A more reasonable exclusion
procedure would better protect the LPR without undue damage to
the government's interests.
Since undisclosed, confidential information provides the basis for
317. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 525.
318. See supra text accompanying note 222.
319. A common perception of the INS was voiced over 35 years ago in Congress: "[i]f we
give every alien that is turned back ... a right to appear before a board of inquiry as a matter
of right, our difficulties will mount. The Immigration Service is shorthanded now. They do
not have a third enough people to do their job." Hearings, supra note 214, at 284 (comment by
Rep. Gossett).
320. See supra notes 185-213.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 218-25.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 214-17.
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a summary exclusion, the procedural due process balance hinges on
that point. Modified in camera review conducted by an independent
tribunal strikes the balance. Such a procedure ensures adequate pro-
tection for the government's interests and offers the LPR strict scru-
tiny at both the procedural and substantive levels. By preventing one
party from unduly undermining the interests of the other, modified in
camera review strikes a reasonable balance between the respective pri-
vate and public interests. Additionally, because the in camera proce-
dure nullifies the government's ability to make arbitrary and
capricious exclusions, the underlying goals of the fifth amendment's
due process clause are functionally satisfied.
Any additional fiscal and administrative burdens on the govern-
ment resulting from such new procedures are fully justified. In gen-
eral, there have been relatively few exclusions where undisclosed
confidential information could play a role.3 23 Summary exclusions
were never intended to handle large numbers of cases.3 24 Indeed,
there has been a dearth of litigation in the federal courts regarding
summary exclusions of returning LPRs.3 2S With the procedures out-
lined above, the government will rarely be able to resort to confiden-
tial information to exclude an LPR. Given the compelling private
interests at stake in exclusion, the actual burdens on the government
will remain within acceptable fiscal limits.
VII. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE REPEAL OF SECTION 235(c)
This Note has discussed the procedural due process inadequacies
of the section 235(c) summary exclusion laws. The legislative history
outlined below illustrates Congress' complete disregard for the due
process rights of any alien subject to summary exclusion. This sec-
tion, therefore, argues that the underlying assumptions of summary
exclusion are no longer constitutionally valid, and concludes that
Congress should repeal a law that is an outdated relic of the past.
323. From approximately 1964-1984, "almost 70 million non-immigrant visas were issued,
and 519 were denied under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)]." Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880,
888 n.26 (1984), vacated, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (citing
affidavit of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Louis P. Goelz).
324. See Hearings, supra note 214, at 287 (statement of Michael Horan, special assistant to
the Attorney General). Section 235(c) "is reserved only for those relativelyfew cases where we
have information that cannot be brought out in a hearing, that is from intelligence sources,
disclosure of which would be prejudicial." Id. (emphasis added).
325. Only one other challenge to the summary exclusion of an LPR has been brought
before the federal courts. In United States ex rel. Pagliera v. Savoretti, 139 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.
Fla. 1956), the procedure was held unconstitutional.
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A 1950 Senate Report ("Report") provided the basic foundations
for the INA.3 26 The Report asserted that investigations of aliens re-
vealed a "need for imposing additional immigration restrictions with
respect to the admission . . .of those aliens who it [was] believed
[sought] to enter the United States to engage in activities subversive to
the national security. '3 27 Noting the extent of the "Communist
threat" and the importance of aliens to the success of Communism in
the United States,328 the Report urged that existing immigration law
was inadequate to prevent the entry of subversives. 329
The Report's reasoning illuminates the original motivations be-
hind summary exclusion. It lamented the difficulties associated with
proving that certain aliens and organizations advocated the overthrow
of the government.330 It noted that immigration law inadequately ac-
counted for the problems in revealing the concealed, "real intentions"
of communist organizations. 331 The authors asserted that "since by
the very nature of such organizations their true purpose is concealed,
it is difficult to prove that alien members fall within the proscribed
excludable class of those who advocate the overthrow of government
by force and violence. '33
2
The authors of the Report were clearly not interested in provid-
ing due process of law to any alien. The subsequent Congressional
debates on section 235(c) reflected this attitude. For example, during
debates on section 235(c), one representative remarked, "I think we
give [the] alien all the protection he is entitled to. It is a matter of
326. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 798 (1950). This report was incorporated by
explicit reference into the legislative history of the INA. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 27 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1683.
327. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 798 (1950).
328. Id. at 781-82. "As an international conspiracy, communism has organized systematic
infiltration of our borders for the purpose of overthrowing the democratic Government of the
United States by force, violence and subversion." Id. The Report asserted that since commu-
nism was necessarily an "alien force," it was "easy to see that the forces of world communism
must... find ways and means for getting their minions into this country if they are to maintain
[their] effectiveness...." Id. at 782.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 797. "While Congress has clearly prescribed classes of aliens which are to be
excluded... there is the obvious difficulty of establishing that certain aliens and organizations
do advocate overthrowing the Government by force and violence." Id.
331. Id. "It is inherent in the tactics of [communist] persons and organizations that their
real intentions be concealed under an aura of legitimacy in order to accomplish their purpose.
Thus, while it may be common knowledge that certain organizations advocate such beliefs,
satisfactory proof of that position offers a formidable obstacle." Id.
332. Id.
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charity and grace in the first place. ' 333 Senator McCarran, a sponsor
of the INA, expressed the view that "[flrom time immemorial, a sov-
ereign nation has had the absolute right to admit or exclude
aliens. ' 334 He justified denying any alien procedural protections by
reminding Congress that "no alien has ever had a right to enter the
United States .... No country on earth today gives non-nationals any
legal, moral, or equitable right . . . to cross its borders as
immigrants."1335
Although the Report viewed existing law as inadequate, its au-
thors did not have to look beyond the letter of the law to implement
more restrictive exclusion procedures. The Report noted that Con-
gress already authorized the President "to impose additional restric-
tions on the entry into and departure of persons from the United
States when the United States [was] at war or during the existence of
[a] national emergency. '"336 President Roosevelt exercised this power
by declaring such an emergency on May 27, 1941.337
The Attorney General and Secretary of State then promulgated a
regulation which closely resembled section 235(c). 33 The Report
stated that this regulation "continue[s] in effect as part of the immi-
gration laws, since the national emergency has never been terminated
and a state of war still exists."' 339 With few dissenting voices,34 Con-
gress incorporated the substance of these emergency and wartime reg-
ulations into the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act; these
regulations still exist today in the form of summary exclusion. 341
Although the "Communist threat" seems less menacing today
than forty years ago, the McCarthy-era reasoning used to support
summary exclusion laws could be applied to the current threat posed
by terrorist groups and drug cartels. These present-day perils to the
nation's security are at least as menacing as the threat posed by Com-
333. Hearings, supra note 214, at 284.
334. 98 CONG. REc. 5789 (1952).
335. Id.
336. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 794 (1950).
337. Id. In a proclamation issued on November 14, 1941, President Roosevelt said that
"[n]o alien shall be permitted to enter the United States if it appears... that such entry would
be prejudicial to the interests of the United States .... Presidential Proclamation 2523, 3
C.F.R. 270, 271 (1938-1943 Compilation).
338. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 794 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 175.53 (1945 Supp.)).
339. S. REP. No. 1515 at 794.
340. See 98 CONG. REc. 4435, 5789 (1952) (comments of Rep. Powell and Sen. Morse).
341. Compare 66 Stat. 163, 199 (1952) with 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (1988) (section 235(c) un-
changed since its enactment in 1952).
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munism forty years ago. Just as Congress considered Communism to
be a threat from "an alien force, ' 342 the government could similarly
argue that aliens have assumed a comparable role with the importa-
tion of drugs343 and terrorism. Further, such activities may be ex-
tremely difficult to uncover and ultimately prove. This difficulty
provides the sense of urgency used to justify summary exclusion.
Admittedly, it may be difficult to establish that an LPR's activi-
ties further the unlawful aims of a terrorist organization or drug car-
tel. 344 But Congress should repeal a procedure that circumvents such
difficulties at the expense of fully compromising the constitutional
rights of returning LPRs. If the government normally carries the bur-
den of proving excludability, 345 then it should shoulder that burden
regardless of the degree of difficulty presented by any particular case.
Assuming concerns surrounding alien involvement with terror-
ism and drugs are valid, summary exclusion still remains inherently
flawed. The law's underlying assumptions about alien rights346 are
obsolete unconstitutional relics of another time. The McCarthy-era
Congress simply grouped returning LPRs into the same constitutional
category as first-time alien entrants. 347 It would have scoffed at the
modem concept of an LPR's procedural due process rights upon re-
turning to this country after a brief trip abroad. Congress, today,
should not countenance the use of a law that completely ignores the
constitutional rights of returning LPRs. Rather, it should repeal
summary exclusion laws on the ground that they are outdated, uncon-
stitutional anomalies.
342. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 782 (1950).
343. This perspective, of course, minimizes the country's demand for drugs.
344. Compare remarks made by a Deputy Attorney General during hearings on section
235(c). He emphasized the inadequate "means of performing the necessary investigations,
some of which might lead to places far behind the iron curtain, which would be necessary to
separate those who are truly repentant Communists from among those who may claim to be
but are not." Hearings, supra note 214, at 713 (statement of Peyton Ford). This argument
provides no legitimate justification for the drastic remedy of completely withholding
information.
345. Kwong Hai Chew v. Rogers, 257 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 333-35.
347. "The authority of the Congress over the admission of aliens is plenary, and it may
exclude them altogether or prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may enter...
the country." S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 798 (1950) (citing Lapina v. Williams,
232 U.S. 78 (1914) and Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals in Rafeedie v. INS 348 held that Rafeedie, as
an LPR returning from a two-week trip abroad, was entitled to due
process of law in an exclusion proceeding. 349 However, the approval
of summary exclusion procedures currently in force would necessitate
the conclusion that the due process balance completely favors the
government over Rafeedie and similar returning LPRs. This Note
has shown that the current procedure completely compromises
Rafeedie's numerous and weighty private interests, seemingly forbid-
den by any reasonable interpretation of due process.
Although the government has legitimate interests, the due pro-
cess balance struck by this Note shows that there is no compelling
governmental need for a "truly summary action," 350 which creates the
possibility of serious abuse. Such abuse results from basing exclusions
on undisclosed confidential information. Disclosure of such informa-
tion, in camera, to an independent tribunal with exclusion authority
or to the LPR's advocate ad litem, would strike the balance between
Rafeedie's interest in a full hearing and the government's desire to
protect its security interests. Imposing such additional safeguards
would not be unduly burdensome and would deter governmental at-
tempts to improperly and summarily exclude aliens by simply invok-
ing "national security" concerns. Because the new procedure
prevents arbitrary and capricious exclusions, the functional goals of
the fifth amendment's due process clause are preserved.
But since the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it refuses
to "displace congressional choices of policy," 35' the procedural reme-
dies proposed by this Note may in fact be a matter for Congress. Cer-
tainly, none of the original assumptions about aliens which support
summary exclusion provide constitutionally-sound justifications for
upholding the law today. On the contrary, those assumptions de-
mand the repeal of section 235(c). In drafting a replacement mea-
sure, Congress should pay close attention to a warning voiced by
Justice Jackson against the indiscriminate use of confidential
information.
Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its
348. 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
349. Id. at 524.
350. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 41 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
351. Id. at 34-35.
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name . . .. In the name of security the police state justifies its
arbitrary oppressions on evidence that is secret, because security
might be prejudiced if it were brought to light in hearings. The
plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men,
because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed,
the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer unde-
tected and uncorrected.
352
Steven J. Simerlein *
352. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
' This Note is dedicated to my wife Ana for her patience and understanding.
